≡ Menu

Johnson v. United States, USSC No. 13-7120, 2015 WL 2473450 (June 26, 2015), reversing and remanding United States v. Johnson, 526 Fed. Appx. 708 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (8th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A six-Justice majority of the Supreme Court holds that “the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry required by the residual clause [of the Armed Career Criminal Act] both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges” because the case law has failed to establish a generally applicable test that prevents application of the clause from devolving into “guesswork and intuition.” (Slip op. at 5, 8). Therefore, using the residual clause to increase a defendant’s sentence denies the defendant due process of law.

[continue reading…]

{ 1 comment }

State v. Kamille M., 2014AP2911, District 1, 6/26/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective at Kamille M.’s TPR grounds trial for failing to object to hearsay and to the state’s veiled reference to the best interests of the child during closing arguments.

[continue reading…]

{ 0 comments }

State v. Nathan Lewis Teasdale, 2015AP338-CR, District 4, 6/25/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer reasonably suspected that Teasdale was violating § 341.61(2), which prohibits displaying on a registration plates that are not issued for that vehicle, even though the officer was mistaken in believing that the make and model of the car was different from the make and model of the car for which the plates were issued.

[continue reading…]

{ 0 comments }

Town of Bloomfield v. Petko Zvetkov Barashki, 2015AP226, District 2, 6/24/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In a case the court of appeals aptly describes as “unusual,” the court exercises its discretionary power of reversal under § 752.35 to throw out Barashki’s OWI 1st conviction and refusal finding on the grounds that the evidence doesn’t show the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Barashki.

[continue reading…]

{ 0 comments }

Caroline P. v. Shawn H., 2014AP2004 & 2014AP2005, District 3, 6/24/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Even if the circuit court considered the statutory factors for termination of parental rights under § 48.426, the court lacked an evidentiary foundation in the record to make a determination as to whether termination was in the best interests of the child.

[continue reading…]

{ 0 comments }

City of Los Angeles v. Patel, USSC No. 13-1175, 2015 WL 2473445 (June 22, 2015), affirming 738 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A majority of the Supreme Court holds that a Los Angeles ordinance compelling hotel operators to make their guest registries available to police for inspection on demand is facially unconstitutional because it penalizes the hoteliers for declining to turn over their records without affording them any opportunity to obtain judicial review of the reasonableness of the demand prior to suffering penalties for refusing to comply. Along the way, the Court clarifies that “facial challenges under the Fourth Amendment are not categorically barred or especially disfavored” (slip op. at 4), clarifying language from Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), that some courts have read as barring facial challenges to statutes under the Fourth Amendment.

[continue reading…]

{ 0 comments }

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, No. 14-6368, 6/22/15, reversing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 744 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2014); SCOTUSblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Although the SPD doesn’t appoint counsel to litigate excessive force claims against law enforcement, this case may interest your clients. It stems from a deputy’s tasing of a pre-trial detainee at the Monroe County Jail in Sparta, Wisconsin.  In a 5-4 decision, SCOTUS held for the detainee. To prevail on an excessive force claim under § 42 U.S.C. §1983, the detainee must show only that the force purposefully or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable. [continue reading…]

{ 0 comments }

The 4th Amendment has been described by Conservative HQ as “one of the most important arrows in the quiver against bullying big government.” Because the government doesn’t just search and seize paper–it also goes after your cell phones, your Facebook account, your email (even when stored on Google’s server), your tweets, your DNA (by definition, your family’s DNA) etc.–we want a sturdy Fourth Amendment, right? Justice Scalia thinks so. He’s been called the 4th Amendment’s “premier defender.”   Unfortunately, it seems that SCOW disagrees, and not just now when conservatives hold a majority on the court. Voting patterns over the past 19 years suggest that 4th Amendment challenges might go down in yearbooks as “the least likely to succeed” in SCOW. See the data for yourselves on today’s edition of SCOWstats, which shows how the 4th Amendment has fared term-by-term and justice-by-justice.

In case you’re wondering, challenges under Article 1, §11 of the Wisconsin Constitution receive no greater affection.

What do YOU think about the 4th Amendment’s status as persona non grata in SCOW? Feel free to submit a “comment” below.

{ 0 comments }
RSS