Artillis Mitchell v. Chris S. Buesgen & Kevin A. Carr, 2022AP1076, 2/22/24, District 4 (recommended for publication); case activity
This case concerns Mitchell’s appeal from the circuit court’s order dismissing his petition for a writ of certiorari. We recognize the case is a bit outside of our normal coverage, but in addition to the fact that D4 has recommended this decision for publication, the case presents an interesting, if somewhat technical, application of law to a factual scenario that is likely of some interest to our readers. The bottom line is that the denial of Mitchell’s petition is affirmed, despite the fact that he indisputably filed proof that he fully exhausted all available administrative remedies, because he failed to file “all documents related to the administrative process.” Op., ¶33-34.
While this post will not attempt to fully address or even summarize all of the issues, sub-issues, and arguments addressed by the opinion, the decision is well-worth a full read for anyone interested in this area of law. A particularly frustrating aspect of the case is that the rules applicable to inmate challenges to administrative (DOC) decisions are complex, technical, and onerous, and yet, inmates pursuing such claims are generally pro se. Even if they do obtain counsel, as Mitchell did on appeal through the State Bar of Wisconsin’s Appellate Practice Section pro bono program, procedural errors committed early on can easily result in dismissal of claims before any court addresses the merits of the inmate’s complaint.
Mitchell received a conduct report while imprisoned at Stanley Correctional Institution that resulted in “disciplinary separation” and a restitution order for costs associated with a medical response to the incident. Mitchell initiated an administrative complaint through the DOC’s inmate complaint review system. Mitchell’s complaints were denied all the way up to the secretary of the DOC, who accepted the lower level recommendations to deny Mitchell’s complaints. Op., ¶¶6-7.
Mitchell then sought review by certiorari in the circuit court in Dane County. Within 45-days of the secretary’s decision, Mitchell mailed his petition along with a number of related documents from prison to the circuit court. Eventually, the circuit court denied his petition after it “determined that Mitchell failed to state a claim based on the fact that he had not submitted all required documents within the 45-day limitation period.” One argument Mitchell made on appeal was that any failure to submit “all documents related to the administrative process” within the 45-day deadline was harmless because the documents he did submit establish that he fully exhausted his administrative remedies. The court agreed that “Mitchell timely provided proof of exhaustion. Nevertheless, the pertinent statutes unambiguously require more…”
Section 801.02(7)(c) uses expansive, unqualified language that on its face represents a legislative determination that a submission must timely include all such documents, not only those proving exhaustion-in-fact. The apparent legislative intent is to require prisoners to provide the court with a complete picture of what occurred in the administrative process when a writ action is commenced and before a response is required from the respondent. This is what Mitchell failed to do. Thus, he did not satisfy the requirements under the only reasonable interpretation of §§ 893.735(2) and 801.02(7)(c). If the legislature had meant to require only the documents that Mitchell timely submitted, it would have used different terms. It would be for the legislature to relax the requirement to require only that prisoners submit documents sufficient to establish exhaustion-in-fact. Op., ¶34.
So, the court’s plain reading of the statute is that Mitchell needed to submit additional documents even if his exhaustion of administrative remedies was clearly established by the documents he did submit within 45 days. At the same time, the court asserts that
when the terms of Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(c) are considered as a whole, it could create confusion that the statute refers in part to the requirement that a prisoner submit “documentation showing that [the prisoner] has exhausted all available administrative remedies.” Op., ¶33.
For this reason, and for the sake of clarity, the court uses the phrase “administrative-process documents” instead of “proof of exhaustion documents.” Unfortunately, that clarity doesn’t help Mitchell at this point.
While Mitchell further argued that the 45-day deadline was tolled because he filed his “initial pleadings” well-within the deadline, and then he subsequently submitted all “administrative-process documents” after the 45-day deadline, the court disagrees and concludes that the caselaw requires dismissal where the prisoner failed to place all required documents that were in the prisoner’s control in a prison mailbox within the 45-day deadline. Op., ¶31.
