Christopher Roalson v. Jon Noble, No. 22-2833, 8/28/24
The Seventh Circuit affirms an order denying habeas relief, applying pre-Smith law on the confrontation clause, as the underlying WI COA decision dates back to 2014. The Court concludes that the rule the COA applied–“one expert cannot act as a mere conduit for the opinion of another” and must instead “render[] her own expert opinion”–did not contradict Melendez-Diaz or Bullcoming, the established precedent at the time.
This habeas appeal arises from a Wisconsin case, in which Roalson was sentenced to life in prison for stabbing and bludgeoning a 93-year-old woman to death during a robbery. (p.1). At Roalson’s trial, a crime lab analyst who did not develop the DNA “profiles” from the evidence testified that she was able to come to her own conclusions by comparing those “profiles” to “standards” (a person’s DNA sample). Another analyst had swabbed evidence collected from the scene, tested the DNA samples he recovered, and concluded that Roalson’s DNA was a possible contributor to some of the samples, including the knives. That analyst was unavailable to testify at trial. (p.3). The analyst who did testify explained that “her analysis was just like that of a peer reviewer, who examines the principal analyst’s work. But in the peer review process, the reviewer does not retest the sample because the initial swab generates ‘the best collection of that DNA.'” (p.3).
Roalson was found guilty at trial and he appealed his state conviction, arguing the trial court violated his right to confrontation by allowing the reviewing analyst to testify. The COA affirmed, applying a rule from the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Luther Williams. Citing Williams, he COA “explained the Confrontation Clause is not always violated when one analyst testifies to his own conclusions about samples tested by another analyst. When the testifying analyst can provide an independent evaluation of the initial report, the original analyst need not be called.” (p.4).
The Court analyzes the federal Confrontation Clause case law that existed at the time of the WI COA’s decision, and concludes that Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) does not provide a clearly established rule applicable to Roalson’s petition. The Court therefore looks to Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming:
the next question is whether the rule that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied is an unreasonable application of clearly established law. That rule, from Luther Williams, provides “one expert cannot act as a mere conduit for the opinion of another” and must instead “render[] her own expert opinion.” Luther Williams, 644 N.W.2d at 926; see State v. Deadwiller, 834 N.W.2d 362, 377 (Wis. 2013) (applying rule). The testifying expert cannot be just anyone. The expert must be “highly qualified[,]” “familiar with the procedures at hand[,]” and must have “supervise[d] or review[ed] the work of the testing analyst.” Luther Williams, 644 N.W.2d at 926.
That rule does not contradict Melendez-Diaz or Bullcoming. To the contrary, it expressly prohibits a state from introducing an underlying report through testimony and requires that an analyst form an independent opinion and testify to that independent opinion. See Deadwiller, 834 N.W.2d at 370 n.7.
(pp.10-11). Having determined that the rule the COA applied did not clearly violate federal law, the Court then applies that rule and concludes that the state did not violate the WI rule by introducing the first analyst’s report through their testifying analyst. (p.11). Regardless, the Court finds that any potential error was harmless, as the analyst’s testimony was not the most important evidence for the state. (pp.12-13).
Keep in mind, this decision does not apply the recent SCOTUS case on the Confrontation Clause, Smith v. Arizona, so it’s applicability is limited. In a footnote, the Court explains as follows:
The Supreme Court recently decided another Confrontation Clause case that touches on the question here. Smith v. Arizona, 144 S. Ct. 1785 (2024). In that case, an analyst who did not testify collected some samples, tested them, and concluded that they tested positive for certain drugs. Another analyst reviewed this report to reach his own, independent conclusion about what the samples were, but also testified to the substance of the other analyst’s report. Id. at 1795. The Court held that the testifying analyst testified to the truth of the other analyst’s report and remanded for the state court to determine whether the report was testimonial. Id. at 1799– 1802.
That Supreme Court case does not affect our analysis, as the Wisconsin Court of Appeals issued its decision in 2014. See Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (“[Section] 2254(d)(1) requires federal courts to focu[s] on what a state court knew and did, and to measure state-court decisions against this Court’s precedents as of the time the state court renders its decision.” (quotations and emphasis omitted) (second alteration in original)).
(pp.6-7).
