Winnebago County v. J.S., 2024AP1333, 3/5/25, District II (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
In yet another case testing the applicability of SCOW’s D.J.W. mandate, COA finds that the circuit court “barely” satisfied those requirements and affirms.
“Jacob” argues that the circuit court failed to make sufficient findings in order to find him dangerous under the “Fifth Standard” of § 51.20(1)(a)2. (¶12). He does not otherwise contest the sufficiency of the evidence. (¶13). Although the County concedes that the circuit court could have done more to satisfy its D.J.W. obligations, COA agrees that the findings were sufficiently “adequate.” (Id.).
Jacob’s strongest argument is that the court failed to adequately address the second prong of the Fifth Standard, requiring the court to find that Jacob was incompetent to make an informed decision, after receiving a sufficient explanation, about medication. (¶15). Here, the court “did not summarize” the applicable testimony “in detail.” (Id.). Instead, it appears to have made a cursory finding “that Jacob was not able to express the requisite understanding on this issue.” (Id.). “This suggests that the Court adopted [the expert’s] opinion, reflected in both his testimony and report, with respect to Jacob’s ability to appreciate the advantages and disadvantages of medication and treatment.” (Id.).
COA relies on State v. Martwick, a suppression appeal, for the proposition that “If a trial court fails to make a finding that exists in the record, an appellate court can assume that the trial court determined the fact in a manner that supports the trial court’s ultimate decision.” (Cleaned up.) (¶15). We note that the possibility of a harmless error analysis has floated around the concept of a “D.J.W. violation” since the issue’s inception. However, at least on paper, COA’s citation of Martwick–involving a completely different fact-finding context–appears at odds with the clear holding of D.J.W. We therefore predict this paragraph will be the focus of Jacob’s inevitable PFR.
Overall, COA cites a prior unpublished decision for the proposition that “a complete compendium of all of the prior testimony” is not required when “the trial court found the petitioner’s witnesses credible on all points, […] there was no significant evidence pointing to contrary findings, and […] the court explicitly identified the dangerous definition in the fifth standard.” (¶17). Even if the court’s findings were “barely” adequate, they were sufficient to avoid a technical violation and COA affirms. (Id.).
