Vernon County v. F.W.R., 2024AP203, District IV, 11/6/24 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
COA rejects F.W.R.’s challenges to his involuntary commitment order under Wis. Stat. § 51.20 for alcohol dependence, concluding that a person may be involuntarily committed for treatment for alcoholism, the circuit court followed the proper procedures and the county met its burden to prove that he was drug dependent and dangerous.
First, the COA concludes that § 51.20 authorizes an involuntary commitment for the treatment of alcoholism. (¶11). Whether “drug dependence” for purposes of § 51.20 includes alcohol dependence is a matter of first impression. Becuase “drug” is not defined in ch. 51, the court looks to the term “alcoholism,” which is defined as “a disease which is characterized by the dependency of a person on the drug alcohol. . . ” (¶13). As a result, the COA reasons that “This definition indicates not only that alcohol is considered a drug for the purposes of ch. 51, but also that alcoholism is a category of drug dependence involving a person’s dependence on the drug alcohol.” Therefore, both § 51.20 and § 51.45 are available for treating a person’s alcoholism.
Because the COA concludes that § 51.20 is available to commit an individual for his or her alcoholism, F.W.R.’s next argument–that the court did not follow the proper procedure to convert the 51.45 petition to a 51.20 petition–also fails. The COA concludes that the petition was properly filed under 51.20 and did not require conversion. (¶¶27-31).
Finally, the COA concludes that the county satisfied its burden to prove F.W.R. was drug dependent, a proper subject for treatment and dangerous. (¶32). The county presented clear and convincing evidence that F.W.R.’s alcoholism met the definition of “drug dependence” because a doctor testified it was beyond his ability to control and had caused severe medical conditions likely to result in his death. As to treatability, the COA rejects F.W.R.’s argument that the circuit court based its decision on its experience in alcohol court because the county presented sufficient evidence. The COA concludes the county met its burden as to dangerousness because F.W.R. had a “pattern of impaired judgment” that caused him to “continue consuming alcohol despite the serious medical consequences of doing so.” In addition, F.W.R. had been receiving treatment services in the community but had continued to use alcohol.
