Waukesha County v. A.T., 2025AP167, 4/2/25, District II (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
“Amber” appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her 6-year-old daughter, “Holly.” She argues the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion at disposition. COA affirms under the deferential, erroneous exercise of discretion standard.
Holly was removed from Amber’s care at the age of two due to Amber’s substance abuse issues. She was then placed in three homes over the next four years under a CHIPS order. (¶2). The county then filed a TPR petition alleging the following grounds: (1) continuing CHIPS; and (2) failure to assume parental responsibility. See Wis. Stat. §§ 48.415(2) & (6). (¶¶2-3). After a jury trial on grounds, the circuit court found Amber unfit. The court then held a dispositional hearing, at the end of which it found that it was in Holly’s best interests to terminate Amber’s parental rights. (¶3).
Amber concedes that the circuit court considered five of the six Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3) factors, but argues the court failed to properly consider and weight sub. (c)—”Whether the child has substantial relationships with the parent or other family members, and whether it would be harmful to the child to sever these relationships.”
COA first quotes the circuit court’s best interest analysis in full, emphasizing the portions directly relevant to § 48.426(3)(c). (¶7). Although “the court’s analysis may not have been extensive, it was adequate” as the court considered the relationships Holly had with Amber and other family members. “[T]he statute does not require consideration of any and all family relationships the child has, but rather only those that are substantial.” (¶9).
For its “substantial relationships” analysis, COA looks to the definition of “substantial parental relationship” which is defined as “the acceptance and exercise of significant responsibility for the daily supervision, education, protection and care of the child,” in a related statute—§ 48.415(6)(b). COA analyzes the facts in this case and finds that the termination of Amber’s parental rights did not sever any substantial family relationships, as Amber was the only family member with whom Holly might have had a substantial relationship given that Amber cared for her for the first two years of her life. (¶¶10-14).
COA rejects Amber’s argument that the circuit court erred by not explicitly stating that it would not “be harmful to sever” Amber’s relationship with Holly. The court stated that without termination, Holly would be left in an indefinite state of impermanency and instability. COA concludes this was sufficient, as courts are not required to use “magic words.” See State v. Bolstad, 2021 WI App 81, ¶¶16, 23 n.7; 399 Wis. 2d 815, 967 N.W.2d 164; State v. B.W., 2024 WI 28, ¶78, 412 Wis. 2d 364, 8 N.W.3d 22. (¶¶15-16).
Finally, the court acknowledges the difficulty involved in TPR cases, and Amber’s love for and desire to maintain her parental rights to Holly, but notes that “the dispositional hearing is not about Amber’s best interests but rather it is about Holly’s best interests.” (¶17 (citing Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2)).
