COA affirms competency ruling but reverses involuntary medication order

State v. M.M.K., 2024AP591-CR, 2024AP592-CR, 2024AP593-CR, 2024AP594-CR, 10/31/24, District IV(1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

In a case which continues a new trend in appeals of involuntary medication appeals, COA holds that while the circuit court correctly found M.M.K. incompetent, it failed to correctly apply Sell in ordering involuntary medication.

M.M.K. was charged in four separate criminal cases for violating the same underlying harassment restraining order. (¶2). M.M.K. is alleged to have harassed her husband by sending him “abusive” emails and by making disparaging social media posts. (Id.). Competency was raised pretrial, and the court held two contested hearings as to competency and involuntary medication. (¶7). It found M.M.K. was incompetent to proceed and also entered an order authorizing the involuntary administration of medication. (Id.). She challenges both orders on appeal:

Competency

Here, COA’s review of the court’s order is deferential, as the determination of incompetency is “functionally a factual finding.” (¶15). The court “found that M.M.K. was intelligent and understood court proceedings, but that she lacked capacity to assist in her defense.” (¶16). It specifically credited testimony that her untreated mental illness rendered her unable to “fully understand certain aspects of assisting in her own defense.” (Id.). (brackets omitted). COA holds that the court properly exercised its discretion when it relied on this testimony and incorporated the examiner’s opinion on these points. (¶17). M.M.K. contends, however, that the circuit court erred by relying on the filing of an involuntary medication petition in determining the threshold issue of competency. (¶19). The court agrees that such reliance would constitute an erroneous exercise of discretion. (Id.). However, its review of the record does not reveal any such reliance. (¶21).

Involuntary Medication 

As to the involuntary medication order, COA focuses on the first Sell factor, which asks whether the government has an “important” interest in prosecuting M.M.K. for “serious, but nonviolent, crimes.” (¶24). In other words, the State must establish a sufficiently compelling basis to override M.M.K.’s constitutionally-protected right of refusal. (¶25). That interest is prosecutorial in nature and does not concern itself with M.M.K.’s own safety or wellbeing. (Id.). Essentially, the government must prove that its interest in trying to obtain a conviction is sufficient to set aside M.M.K.’s rights. (Id.). However, even if the crimes are serious, the court must still consider whether special circumstances “mitigate the State’s interest in prosecution.” (Id.). COA acknowledges that there is, however, scant case law applying this test, so it tries to give clarification in resolving M.M.K’s appeal.

As to the first factor–the seriousness of the offense–COA looks to “how the legislature has designated the crime and the maximum amount of incarceration that could be ordered if the defendant were convicted.” (¶31). That analysis favors M.M.K., as these charges are misdemeanors, are not denoted as “serious” in any statute, and carry only nine months of jail, each. (Id.). Moreover, the facts of this case do not evince any sufficiently dangerous or threatening conduct. (¶32). While COA notes that the number of violations is a point in the State’s favor, it holds that this fact alone does not override M.M.K.’s interest in avoiding unwanted medication. (¶33).