State v. A.L., 2025AP177, 4/22/25, District I (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
Despite the respondent’s claim that she was never given notice of the time for a jury status hearing, COA affirms the circuit court’s default finding.
“Allie” received the usual warning given to parents in TPR matters–to appear at all future court dates, lest she be defaulted. (¶4). At a final pretrial hearing, the circuit court reminded the parties that the trial would occur in “19 days.” (¶5). In response to questions from some of the lawyers, the circuit court also stated there would be a “check-in” on the day of the trial at 9:00 AM. (Id.).
A footnote from COA emphasizes that the record lacks clarity as to what was placed on the record with respect to scheduling. Accordingly, it resorts to judicial notice in order to find, based on CCAP, that the circuit court scheduled three hearings on the trial date: (1) an in-person check-in at 9:00; (2) a jury status hearing at 9:30; and (3) the trial at 1:30.
Allie failed to appear for the jury status hearing. (¶6). By 10:40, the State moved for default–which trial counsel opted not to oppose–and the circuit court granted the motion. (Id.). Given that Allie was now 2 hours late, the circuit court found her conduct “egregious.” (¶7). It explained that resetting the trial date would impose significant delays which “would violate the letter and the spirit of Wisconsin’s children’s code […].” (Id.).
Following the prove-up as to grounds, Allie appeared in person at the next court date. (¶9). Allie provided a number of explanations for her nonappearance, including that she was “overwhelmed.” (¶10). The State and GAL opposed vacating the default finding and trial counsel–ostensibly Allie’s advocate–also informed the Court that Allie was a difficult client who had repeatedly failed to follow through on scheduling commitments. (¶11). The circuit court declined to reconsider its default finding and then terminated Allie’s parental rights. (¶12).
On appeal, Allie argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in ordering default judgment as a sanction for Allie’s noncompliance with its court order that she appear for all scheduled hearings. (¶15). As COA acknowledges, the circuit court could only impose this harsh sanction if it found that Allie’s conduct was “egregious” or in “bad faith.” (Id.). Although Allie points to a previous unpublished D1 decision for the proposition that a single missed court date is not egregious, COA distinguishes its prior decision because this case involved a failure to appear “on the trial date” unlike the respondent in that case, who failed to appear at a pretrial hearing. (¶20). The circuit court also made a better record as to egregiousness in this case. (Id.). COA therefore relies on an older unpublished decision holding that failure to appear at the grounds trial constitutes egregious conduct meriting default. (¶21).
COA also brushes aside Allie’s argument that she only failed to appear at a jury status hearing instead of the actual trial. (¶22). In its view, this is a distinction without a difference. (Id.). It also accepts the court’s reliance on the goals of the Children’s Code and judicial efficiency. (¶23).
Finally, COA also rejects Allie’s argument that she was not informed of the time of the hearing, relying on the Court’s reference to the 9:00 AM check-in at the pretrial. (¶24). Moreover, Allie never claimed in the circuit court that she did not appear because she was not aware of the time. (¶25). Instead, she offered a number of excuses, none of which were sufficient to overcome the default finding. (¶26).
As we noted above, with respect to COA’s footnote, the record appears sparse as to whether the circuit court actually gave Allie sufficient notice of the hearing in question. The only evidence in the record appears to be the court’s remark to the GAL about a 9:00 AM check-in; as we noted above, COA is reliant on CCAP records to fill in the missing gaps. Thus, at the end of the day, the Court’s deferential review of discretionary decisions seems to be doing much of the heavy lifting here. Still, Allie likely has a meritorious PFR given COA’s–and D1 in particular–potentially inconsistent treatment of such default orders, as acknowledged here in COA’s discussion of the more recent C.D. case.
