State v. J.A.V., 2024AP2081, 4/23/25, District I (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
COA rejects two claims relating to the circuit court’s discretionary decision, including an argument that the circuit court relied on inaccurate information regarding the SJO program.
On appeal, “Joshua” raises two challenges to the circuit court’s discretionary decision to waive him into adult court: (1) it failed to consider his lack of a prior record and (2) missated the length of supervision available under the serious juvenile offender (SJO) program. (¶6).
Prior Record
Joshua’s prior record, or lack thereof, is one of the factors enumerated in the juvenile waiver statute which the circuit court should consider in making its discretionary decision. (¶8). This second factor also requires the court to assess the juvenile’s “motives and attitudes.” (¶12). Here, the court referenced a prior contact with police involving similar allegations. (¶10). The court also discussed what it viewed as a lack of remorse with respect to the present conduct. (¶13). Reading the remarks holistically, COA concludes that the circuit court impliedly acknowledged that Joshua had no prior record. (¶14). Its remarks about the prior contact and what it discerned as his motives and attitudes–the “addictive” viewing of child pornography–are sufficient evidence that the court adequately considered this factor in its oral ruling. (Id.).
Misstatement of Law as to SJO Supervision
Here, the record unambiguously indicates that the court believed that the SJO program allowed for three years of supervision. (¶19). That’s wrong, however, as the statute clearly mandates five years of supervision. Accordingly, Joshua argues that the court erroneously exercised its discretion in relying on that inaccurate understanding of how much time Joshua could spend in the juvenile justice system if he was not waived.
COA does not consider the merits of the argument, however, believing it to have been forfeited. (¶15). Here, the inaccurate information stems from the social worker’s testimony. (¶17). She was being cross-examined by defense counsel when she gave the inaccurate testimony. (¶17). While COA acknowledges that counsel did not specifically invite that testimony, counsel’s use of a filler word during the exchange–“and”–is cited as giving the court the impression that the social worker’s testimony was legally correct. (¶19). Counsel made no effort to correct the inaccurate information and never objected to the court’s usage of, and reliance on, the three-year figure in its decision. (¶20).
During cross-examination, one of the State’s witnesses–likely testifying in a quasi-expert capacity–testified inaccurately. There is no evidence the State ever moved to correct its witness’s testimony. Trial counsel did not catch the error, however, so the circuit court’s ensuing adoption of that erroneous testimony into its ruling is, apparently, beyond the reach of COA.
