Winnebago County v. J.D.M., 2024AP1601, 4/16/25, District II (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
COA affirms the circuit court’s orders recommitting J.D.M. (referred to as “Josh”) for twelve months and authorizing involuntarily administering medication. A jury found Josh mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous to himself or others. Josh argues on appeal that the county did not present sufficient evidence at trial to prove that he was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., d., or e, and the court made insufficient findings to enter the involuntary medication order.
At the trial, Jenna Nelson, a psychologist at WRC, testified she had been treating Josh since 2021, and described his tendency to decompensate. (¶¶3-5). She stated that Josh was “diagnosed with ‘[m]ajor depression, multiple episodes, with psychotic features.]'” (¶6). Nelson testified that Josh’s symptoms were treatable, and that he would not take medication if he were not on a commitment. (¶¶7-8).
Brett VandeWalle, a unit supervisor at WRC, also testified. He also stated that he noticed “significant differences” with Josh’s hygiene, mood and ability to communicate when he was on medication. (¶11).
Dr. George Monese, psychiatrist, testified next. He explained that Josh suffers from “major mood disorder, currently conceptualized as psychotic depression.” (¶13). Monese testified about Josh’s medication and the history of his symptoms on and off the medication. (¶¶13-14). He also testified that Josh had been dangerous to himself and others; specifically that Josh would “throw[] his throat from left to right for about [a] centimeter diversion from the midline” to attempt to clear something he felt in his throat. (¶¶15-16). Monese also testified that Josh had restricted his eating to the point of losing a dangerous amount of weight at one point, and that they had obtained a temporary guardianship to address the issue. (¶17).
Last, Dr. Konstantin Mikheyev, the attending psychiatrist at WRC, testified that he had seen Josh about every 4 weeks, confirmed that Josh was mentally ill, and stated that Josh had been fairly stable recently. (¶19). Mikheyev’s testimony about the medication and Josh’s symptoms was largely similar to that of the other witnesses. (¶¶20-23). Mikheyev stated that he talked to Josh about the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to his medication. In his assessment, Josh was not “capable of applying an understanding of the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives of” the medication to his condition, and lacks insight and judgment as to
medication use. (¶23).
The jury found Josh mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous to himself or others. Consistent with the jury’s verdict, the circuit court entered orders extending Josh’s commitment, indicating he is dangerous under the third, fourth and fifth standards. The court also entered an involuntary medication and treatment order. (¶24).
The parties, and COA, agree that the standard on appeal is: when a committee challenges “the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury verdict,” the verdict “must be sustained if there is any credible evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, to support it.” Outagamie County v. Michael H., 2014 WI 127, ¶21, 359 Wis. 2d 272, 856 N.W.2d 603. Further, the COA is to “search the record for credible evidence that sustains the jury’s verdict[.]” Id. Appellate courts are to “uphold the jury verdict ‘even though [the evidence] be contradicted and the contradictory evidence be stronger and more convincing. Id. (¶26).
COA concludes that the evidence here supported the jury’s determination that Josh was dangerous under the third standard via the recommitment standard, under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. and (1)(am). The county had to prove that if treatment were withdrawn, “he would again face ‘a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself [or other individuals]'” and the court concludes that the county “easily met” that standard: “Specifically, the evidence showed that due to his mental illness, when off medication, Josh engages in dangerous self-harming conduct, including starving himself and also manually manipulating/pulling/’very grotesquely deviating his throat’ in such a way that it causes great danger to himself.” (¶27).
Having concluded that the county met its burden under the sub. 2.c. standard, COA moves on to the medication order. Josh argues the evidence was insufficient to support the circuit court’s determination that he was not competent to decide whether to accept medication. Josh’s argument is based on his contention that he merely “disagreed” with the doctors’ recommendations; however, COA concludes the evidence “showed much more than mere disagreement.” (¶30). The court recaps the doctors’ testimony as to Josh’s lack of understanding of the medication and his diagnosis, and upholds the circuit court’s order under the Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶72, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607. L., standard that, “it is ‘logical[]’ that ‘if a person cannot recognize that he or she has a mental illness, … the person cannot establish a connection between his or her expressed understanding of the benefits and risks of medication and the person’s own illness.'” (¶33 (alterations in original)).
