M.S. v. R.F., 2024AP814, District I, 11/19/24 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s order granting M.S. (referred to as Michelle) relief from her voluntary termination of parental rights because her decision to terminate was premised on terminating R.F.’s (referred to as Richard) parental rights, and the Court of Appeals in a previous decision remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial on whether grounds existed to terminate Richard’s rights.
Shortly after Michelle’s and Richard’s daughter was born (referred to as Morgan), Michelle filed a petition to terminate Richard’s parental rights on the ground that he failed to assume parental responsibility. (¶ 3). A jury found grounds to terminate and the circuit court determined terminating Richard’s rights was in the child’s best interests. To facilitate Morgan’s adoption, Michelle voluntarily terminated her parental rights. (¶ 4).
The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s order terminating Richard’s parental rights because he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the grounds phase. (¶ 6). The Court remanded the case for a new grounds hearing, and a dispositional hearing if necessary.
Now back in the circuit court, Richard filed a motion for sole legal custody and placement, arguing that Michelle did not have standing to pursue terminating Richard’s parental rights because she voluntarily terminated her own rights. Michelle filed a motion asking the circuit court to restore her parental rights under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(f) and (g), which allows a court to relieve a party from a judgment if a prior judgment upon which the judgment is based was reversed or if it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application. However, Michelle’s motion was untimely under Wis. Stat. § 48.46(2), which requires a parent who voluntarily consented to terminating his or her parental rights who seeks relief from the judgment to do so within 30 days after the judgment is entered. (¶ 7).
The circuit court informed the parties that it was considering granting relief to Michelle under § 806.07(1)(h), which allows the court to relieve a party from a judgment for “[a]ny other reasons justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” (¶ 7). After allowing the parties to respond, the court relieved Michelle from her voluntary termination of parental rights under § 806.07(1)(h) because “extraordinary circumstances justified relief due to the unique factual situation that triggered the question of whether Michelle maintained standing post-remand,” and the “underlying questions of whether Richard failed to assume parental responsibility and whether it is in Morgan’s best interests to terminate Richard’s parental rights should be heard on the merits.” (¶ 8).
The Court of Appeals granted Richard’s petition for leave to appeal the circuit court’s non-final order. Richard argued that the grounds for relief under Wis. Stat. § 48.46(2) is restricted to those established in § 806.07(1)(a)-(d) and (f). Michelle argued that § 48.46(2) only limits motions for relief filed by a parent and does not affect what relief the court may grant on its own motion. (¶ 11).
The Court, citing SCOW’s decision in Larry v. Harris, held that the circuit court may act on its own motion under § 806.07 provided the parties are provided notice and an opportunity to be heard. (¶ 13). And because § 48.46(2) only refers to a “parent” who seeks relief from a judgment, the Court concluded the statute does not restrict a circuit court from acting on its own motion under § 806.07(1)(h). (¶ 14).
The Court also rejected Richard’s argument that the circuit court did not correctly apply § 806.07(1)(h) because extraordinary circumstances were not present: “The consequence of letting Michelle’s voluntary termination stand would run completely contrary to her purpose and her knowledge at the time she voluntarily terminated her rights. Michelle believed adoption was in Morgan’s best interests and, at the time, Richard had been found unfit and his parental rights were terminated. Had Richard’s parental rights not been terminated, Michelle would not have voluntarily terminated her rights. It is clear that it would be in the interests of justice to allow this matter to be decided on the merits in this case instead of allowing Michelle’s voluntary termination to preclude an ultimate decision on whether it is in Morgan’s best interests for Richard’s parental rights to be terminated.” (¶ 21).
