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COA affirms circuit court’s decision to proceed under voluntary termination of parental rights statute, Wis. Stat. § 48.41

A.K.B. v. J.J.G., 2024AP1116, 10/9/24, District II (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

“Jay” appeals from orders terminating his parental rights and denying his postdisposition motion, arguing the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it terminated his parental rights under the voluntary termination statute, Wis. Stat. § 48.41, rather than applying the hearing procedure for involuntary terminations as set forth in § 48.422. The COA affirms.

The COA recounts the factual and procedural background of the case in a great deal of detail, which essentially boils down to the following: Jay moved to Oregon after his daughter, “Lisa” was born and had no contact with her for around 6 years. The mother, “Alice” filed a petition to terminate Jay’s parental rights so that her husband could adopt Lisa. Jay went back and forth as to whether this would be a “voluntary” TPR or a contested jury trial on grounds, for which he would have to travel to Wisconsin to attend in person. (¶¶2-24).

Ultimately, Jay informed the circuit court that he would not travel to Wisconsin for a trial and that he was “prepared to proceed with a voluntary on the grounds.” Jay confirmed this decision multiple times.  (¶¶25-26). The court held a dispositional hearing, at which it heard testimony from Jay and others, considered the factors set forth in § 48.426, and determined that it was in Lisa’s best interest that Jay’s parental rights be terminated. (¶¶30-37).

Jay’s argued on appeal that the circuit court erred by following the procedure for a voluntary TPR rather than those for an involuntary TPR because it was clear that he intended to oppose disposition and thus remained in an involuntary TPR posture. The COA reviews the record and finds otherwise. (¶42). The court repeatedly warned Jay he would have to be physically present to remain in the involuntary posture, Jay told the court he had decided to go with a “voluntary” and the court repeatedly referenced § 48.41. (¶¶44-45). The court complied with the requirement to ascertain certain basic information in determining whether the parent’s consent to termination of parental rights is informed and voluntary, pursuant to T.M.F. v. Children’s Service Society of Wisconsin, 112 Wis. 2d 180, 196-97, 332 N.W.2d 293 (1983). (¶47).

A dispositional hearing must occur either way. And while Jay claims that a parent who consents to a voluntary termination of parental rights pursuant to § 48.41 is not entitled to oppose termination at disposition, any error was harmless because the circuit court here allowed him to participate at disposition. (¶¶48-51).

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