State v. Lavelle Edgar Young, 2024AP470, 12/26/24, District I (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s order denying Lavelle Young’s motion to suppress physical evidence and his statements when an officer knocked on the window of his vehicle after observing Young sleeping in the driver’s seat of the vehicle. The Court held that Young was not seized and was not in custody when he was questioned by police.
A Franklin police officer patrolling motel parking lots at 3 a.m. saw the driver of a vehicle – later identified as Young – slumped over the center console of his vehicle. The officer knocked on the passenger window a few times and, after twenty seconds, Young awoke and rolled down the passenger side window. Young said he was fine, but the officer smelled alcohol and marijuana in the vehicle, saw an open bottle of gin in the vehicle, and observed that Young had bloodshot eyes, dilated pupils, and slurred speech. (¶¶ 2-3).
The officer called for backup and searched the vehicle, which did not produce anything of evidentiary value. But the officer saw that the keys were in the auxiliary position and the hood was warm. Young consented to a search of his person, which did not produce any evidence. The officer questioned Young about his activities that night, and Young said he recently drove to the motel and that he was drinking and smoking marijuana earlier in the day. The officer then asked Young to perform field sobriety tests; after Young performed poorly on the tests, he was arrested for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant as a second offense. (¶¶ 4-5). Young’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle and his statements to police were denied by the circuit court. (¶¶ 5-6).
On appeal, Young argued he was seized without reasonable suspicion or probable cause when the officer knocked on the passenger window. The Court of Appeals found Young was not seized, citing SCOW’s 2014 decision in Vogt – where the court found that an officer who parked his squad car directly behind a vehicle in a parking lot, knocked on the vehicle’s window, and ordered the driver to lower the window, did not seize the driver. (¶ 12). The Court concluded a reasonable person in Young’s position would have felt free to leave because: “Young was not stopped by [the officer] but instead was approached while Young was parked in a motel parking lot after [the officer] became concerned upon seeing Young slumped in his vehicle. Young was not blocked in by [the officer’s] squad car and could have backed out of his parking space. Furthermore, Young was in the driver’s seat and [the officer] approached the passenger side of the vehicle, thus, Young could have also freely opened his door, exited his vehicle, and entered the motel.” (¶ 13). Because the Court found that Young was not seized, it did not address the parties’ arguments whether the community caretaker doctrine applied.
The Court disagreed with Young’s argument that the encounter turned into a seizure unsupported by reasonable suspicion after police confirmed he did not need medical assistance. In light of the officer smelling alcohol and marijuana in the vehicle and observing the open bottle of gin, the Court found the officer could “reasonably suspect that Young had operated a vehicle while intoxicated thus permitting him to switch his focus from checking on Young’s condition to investigating Young.” ( ¶ 17).
Young also argued that he was subjected to custodial interrogation and not advised of his Miranda rights. The Court, however, found that the officer did not need to advise Young of his rights because he was not in custody. The Court noted that the questioning occurred in a public place, Young was not handcuffed, the exchange took forty minutes, Young cooperated and made several unprompted statements, and he was told he was not required to perform the field sobriety tests. (¶ 21). The Court rejected Young’s argument that the presence of three officers and repeated questions transformed the encounter into a custodial setting. Noting that Young gave inconsistent answers to some of the officers’ questions, the Court observed that a “reasonable person under these circumstances would not interpret multiple similar questions in response to inconsistent information as a restraint on their freedom to leave.” (¶ 22).