State v. Kruckenberg Anderson, 2023AP396-CR, 7/25/24, District IV (recommended for publication); case activity
The tragic death of a newborn baby in the bucolic countryside of southwest Wisconsin prompted aggressive interrogation techniques by law enforcement that the Court of Appeals considered coercive in light of the suspect’s age of 16. But the court found that a reasonable 16-year old would have felt free to leave when the police told him repeatedly he was not under arrest and did not have to answer questions; law enforcement therefore did not have to advise the suspect of his Miranda rights. The COA affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court’s order suppressing the defendant’s statements.
We review the facts of the case in detail to provide context for the court’s factually-oriented analysis.
Logan Kruckenberg Anderson, who was 16 at the time, was questioned by Brodhead Police (a town of approximately 3,300 between Janesville and Monroe) and other law enforcement agencies in multiple interviews over three days regarding his missing newborn baby, A.B. The sequence of events was as follows:
C.D.’s Residence, January 9, 2021, 2 a.m – 6 a.m.: Kruckenberg was interviewed at the residence of his 14-year old girlfriend, C.D., for approximately four hours. Police learned that C.D. gave birth to A.B. in the residence four days earlier and that Kruckenberg was the father. Kruckenberg told police he gave A.B. to his friend “Tyler” to take to an adoption agency. Kruckenberg was not handcuffed or told he was under arrest, but was questioned after he was placed in a squad car.
First Albany P.D. Interview, January 9, 2 p.m.-5 p.m.: Kruckenberg agreed to accompany officers to the Albany Police Department for an interview (Albany is a town of 1,100 ten miles from Brodhead). He was told that he was not under arrest, but directed to turn over his cell phone. Police transported Kruckenberg in a squad car from Kruckenberg’s residence to the police department. When they arrived at the police department, Kruckenberg was told that he was free to leave. Kruckenberg repeated that he gave the baby to his friend for adoption. Kruckenberg also told police that he had not slept, eaten, or drunk anything for three days. Kruckenberg was not handcuffed, frisked, or physically restrained, but police expressed disbelief at some of Kruckenberg’s version of events and urged him to “make things right and to tell them what occurred.” They also told him cadaver dogs were searching the area.
Brodhead P.D. Interview, January 9-10, 11 p.m.-1:45 a.m: Multiple officers arrived at Kruckenberg’s residence and asked him to answer additional questions at the Brodhead Police Department. Kruckenberg was told that he was not under arrest and did not have to answer questions, but he agreed to accompany the officers to the police station and was transported there in an unmarked squad car. Kruckenberg was not frisked, handcuffed, or physically restrained and police honored Kruckenberg’s request for E.F. to be present during the interview, who was a mother-figure to Kruckenberg. After E.F. arrived at the police station, Kruckenberg was again told that he was not under arrest and did not have to answer questions. E.F. recommended to Kruckenberg that he cooperate with police. Wisconsin DOJ Special Agent James Pertzborn urged Kruckenberg to cooperate and suggested he could help Kruckenberg and that he already knew what happened to the baby. Kruckenberg repeated that he gave the baby to his friend for adoption, but Agent Pertzborn interrupted and accused Kruckenberg of lying. E.F. encouraged Kruckenberg to tell the truth. Kruckenberg attempted to tell Pertzborn he was telling the truth, but Pertzborn continued to interrupt and accused him of lying, asked “whether he is a person with a soul or an evil person,” and said he could not help him if he did not tell the truth. Kruckenberg asked to speak alone with Pertzborn, and E.F. and another officer left the room. Pertzborn took Kruckenberg’s hand for 20 seconds and told him he would help him through it. Pertzborn then told Kruckenberg: “We need to bury, give that precious child of yours, a proper burial. We need to recover that body. Okay? I need you to tell me where [the child’s] at right now.”
Kruckenberg then got teary eyed and tried to show Pertzborn on a map where he took the baby. Kruckenberg said he put the baby in a backpack on the day the baby was born, walked to a wooded area with one of his friends, placed the baby in a hollow tree and put the baby under the snow. Pertzborn again told Kruckenberg he was lying, Kruckenberg started to cry, and Pertzborn asked Kruckenberg to show officers where he left the baby. Kruckenberg agreed and he rode with police to the woods.
The Albany Woods, January 10, 2 a.m.-2:30 a.m.: Kruckenberg directed police to where he left the baby in the woods near Albany. Kruckenberg waited on the side of the road with law enforcement while other officers searched the area. Kruckenberg was not handcuffed or restrained. The baby was found deceased. Pertzborn told Kruckenberg he wanted to ask him more questions, but that he was not under arrest and not required to answer questions. Kruckenberg agreed to further questioning, but without E.F. present, and returned in an unmarked squad car to the Albany Police Department.
2nd Albany P.D. Interview, January 10, 2:35 a.m.-2 p.m.: When they arrived at the police station, Kruckenberg was taken to a conference room and told that he was not under arrest and not required to answer questions. Kruckenberg told police again that he left the baby in the snow. At 4:10 a.m., Kruckenberg was arrested and told he would be charged with homicide. He was driven to the Rock County Juvenile Detention Center and advised of his Miranda rights for the first time, fifteen hours after his first encounter with police. The next day, during two Mirandized interviews, Kruckenberg told police that he shot the baby twice before he left the baby in the woods.
Circuit Court Proceedings: Kruckenberg filed a motion to suppress all of the statements he provided law enforcement. The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing over six days, including testimony from a psychologist regarding whether Kruckenberg’s statements were voluntary in light of the interrogation techniques used by law enforcement. The circuit court granted the motion with respect to all of Kruckenberg’s statements at the Brodhead Police Department, at the Albany Woods, and during the second interview at the Albany Police Department. The circuit court found the statements were involuntary and that Kruckenberg was subjected to custodial interrogation but not advised of his Miranda rights. The State appealed the circuit court’s order, arguing that the statements were voluntary and not the product of custodial interrogation. Kruckenberg did not appeal the circuit court’s order denying his motion to suppress his statements during the other interviews.
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s order suppressing the statements at the Brodhead Police Department after the proper burial comment, the Albany Woods statement, and the second interview at the Albany Police Department. But the court of appeals reversed the order suppressing evidence up to the proper burial comment.
The court remarked that the State bears the burden to show Kruckenberg’s statements were voluntary, and that voluntariness depends on the totality of circumstances in balancing the personal characteristics of the defendant against “pressures imposed by law enforcement officers to determine if the pressures exceeded the defendant’s ability to resist.” (¶¶ 36,38). The court also noted that coercive or improper police conduct is necessary for a finding of involuntariness. (¶ 39).
The court concluded that, “at the point of Pertzborn’s ‘proper burial’ comment, the cumulative techniques used by Pertzborn to elicit Kruckenberg’s incriminating statements were coercive. We make this determination in the context of Kruckenberg’s personal characteristics that made him more susceptible to police pressure, including his age.” (¶ 47).
The court found the following factors established coercive police conduct: 1) repeated and lengthy interviews in the early morning and late at night; 2) no Miranda warnings during the January 10 interactions; 3) heavy psychological pressure including confrontational and accusatory interrogation techniques; 4) emotional and moral appeals to Kruckenberg; 5) leveraging E.F.’s quasi-maternal relationship to pressure Kruckenberg to make incriminating statements; 6) misleading Kruckenberg by suggesting that Pertzborn was there as his advocate; and 7) Pertzborn implying parental familiarity by taking hold of Kruckenberg’s hands. (¶¶ 49-60). The court remarked: “This was the culmination of Pertzborn’s high-pressure interrogation techniques under the particular circumstances here. It happened to have the intended effect. Kruckenberg responded with highly incriminating statements.” (¶ 61).
The court of appeals assumed without deciding that each interrogation technique, viewed in isolation, might not be coercive under different circumstances, but “the numerous techniques used to attempt to elicit incriminating statements – in light of Kruckenberg’s age – were coercive when considered together.” (¶ 63).
Regarding Kruckenberg’s personal characteristics, the court considered his age “one of the most important” for the voluntariness determination. (¶ 66). The court also noted: 1) Kruckenberg had minimal prior experience with law enforcement; 2) his physical mental, and emotional condition made him particularly susceptible to law enforcement pressure; and 3) E.F. did not act as a buffer between Kruckenberg and law enforcement, but encouraged him to tell the truth. (¶¶ 67-72).
The court concluded: “Based on the foregoing factors, the greater weight of the evidence shows that, under the totality of circumstances, Pertzborn’s interrogation techniques, when balanced with Kruckenberg’s personal characteristics, overcame Kruckenberg’s ability to resist pressures brought to bear on him in an unequal confrontation. Therefore, the State has not met its burden of proving that Kruckenberg’s statements after Pertzborn’s ‘proper burial’ comment, were the product of a free and unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice.” (¶ 77).
The court also affirmed the circuit court’s order excluding Kruckenberg’s subsequent statements up to the time he was arrested. The court found that the “subsequent interactions cannot be separated from the circumstances surrounding Kruckenberg’s earlier involuntary statements” and considered the subsequent statements a “continued interrogation.” (¶ 79).
However, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s order excluding Kruckenberg’s statements at the Brodhead Police Department before Pertzborn’s “proper burial” comment. The court noted that Kruckenberg did not argue the statements were involuntary, but only that he was in “custody” for Miranda purposes. The court cited Wisconsin’s two-part test to determine whether a person is in custody under Miranda: 1) whether a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation; and 2) whether the “relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” (¶ 86).
The court concluded that “Pertzborn’s repeated advisements that Kruckenberg was not under arrest, did not have to answer questions, and was free to leave, combined with Kruckenberg’s affirmations that he understood these advisements, weigh strongly against custody.” (¶ 87). The court also noted that Kruckenberg was not frisked, handcuffed, or physically restrained, and E.F. was present and available to drive Kruckenberg home if he asked to leave. (¶¶ 88-89). Although Kruckenberg’s age was a crucial factor in the court’s voluntariness inquiry, the court found that the factors cited above would not have caused a reasonable 16-year-old to believe he was not free to leave. (¶ 91).
