State v. Ryan D. Wilkie, 2022AP730-CR, 3/11/25, District III (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
COA rejects Wilkie’s interesting constitutional arguments regarding the authority of law enforcement to enter his home without a warrant and affirms his conviction for obstructing an officer.
Police were called to Wilkie’s home after a 911 caller heard what he believed to be a physical altercation, including a woman shouting “stop” and “no.” (¶2). As was subsequently clarified at trial, Wilkie had an argument with his teenage daughter, which included her “screaming, yelling and throwing things” and during which he removed her bedroom door from its hinges after she slammed it in anger. (¶6). According to Wilkie, his daughter was also threatening to leave the home without permission. (Id.). Wilkie refused to allow police entry to his home. (¶5). The officers informed Wilkie that his permission was not required and arrested him when he attempted to physically block their entry. (Id.).
Wilkie moved to dismiss the obstructing charge, asserting that police lacked lawful authority, a necessary element of that offense. (¶7). The court denied the motion, finding that the officers were acting as community caretakers when they entered the home. (¶9). After the motion was decided, however, SCOTUS issued its decision in Caniglia v. Strom, which invalidates “community caretaking” as a valid justification for a warrantless entry to the home. Accordingly, Wilkie moved for reconsideration. (¶10). The motion was again denied, as the court now believed the officers were responding to “exigent circumstances” when they entered the home. (Id.). Wilkie appeals following an adverse jury verdict.
Lawful Authority of Law Enforcement
Wilkie first argues that his motion to dismiss should have been granted, as the officers did not have “lawful authority” to enter the home. (¶14). Under SCOW’s interpretation of the obstructing statute, this element requires proof that the “officer’s actions are conducted in accordance with the law.” (Id.). Here, the State argues that the officers’ actions are justified under the “emergency aid exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. (¶17). Under Wisconsin law, the emergency-aid exception applies if the following requirements are met:
[U]nder the totality of circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that: (1) there was an immediate need to provide aid or assistance to a person due to actual or threatened physical injury; and (2) that immediate entry into an area in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy was necessary in order to provide that aid or assistance.
(¶18). In this case, COA concludes the complaint was sufficient to prove the applicability of this exception, as the 911 caller believed he had heard noises consistent with a person “being struck or thrown to the ground” and, based on what he heard, believed that the female screaming “stop” and “no” was being attacked by a male assailant. (¶19). Wilkie’s refusal to allow police inside his home add further support to the reasonable inference that he may have been trying to conceal that someone inside the home was “severely injured or worse.” (¶22).
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Under State v. Lossman, the State needed to prove not only that the officers were acting with lawful authority, but also that Wilkie knew they were so-acting when he barred entry to his home. (¶28). Here, despite evidence that Wilkie loudly protested the lawfulness of the police conduct, COA concludes that a jury could find the requisite subjective intent, that “Wilkie believed that law enforcement was at his home in their official capacity investigating a report that someone might be injured and in need of aid and the officers were thus acting with lawful authority.” (¶30).
