State v. L.J.T., Jr., 2024AP1877-CR, 12/12/24, District IV (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
In a very unique appeal arising from pretrial competency proceedings, COA holds that the defendant was not competent to exercise the right of self-representation and reverses for a new hearing.
L.J.T. was charged with two misdemeanors–disorderly conduct and bail jumping. (¶2). Pretrial, the issue of competency arose and the court appointed an examiner and scheduled a competency hearing. (¶3).
Although the SPD appointed counsel for L.J.T., he was “adamant” that he wanted to proceed pro se. (¶4). The circuit court then conducted the colloquy required under State v. Klessig. (¶5). COA summarizes the transcript of the colloquy as follows:
During the colloquy, L.J.T. appeared to acknowledge that he understood that there were advantages to being represented by an attorney; that an attorney would be appointed to represent him if he could not afford to retain an attorney; and that he
was making the decision to waive his right to counsel freely and voluntarily. However, other answers L.J.T. gave during the colloquy were unresponsive to the
court’s questions and at least arguably evinced delusional thinking
(Id.). The court made a finding that L.J.T. made a knowing and intelligent waiver and therefore permitted him to represent himself during the competency hearing. (¶6). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found L.J.T. incompetent to stand trial and committed L.J.T. to DHS to be restored to competency. (¶10).
On appeal, the State concedes that L.J.T. should not have been allowed to represent himself and COA accepts that concession. (¶13). Based on the transcript of the hearing, COA concludes “it is not possible to conclude that L.J.T. was competent to represent himself at the hearing.” (¶14). COA therefore reverses for a new competency hearing. (Id.).
In a footnote, COA acknowledges that the circuit court was placed in a difficult position and, had it denied L.J.T.’s request, he probably would be appealing that order by citing to favorable federal court case law which has repeatedly criticized Wisconsin’s approach to the issue of self-representation.
Certainly, some of the court’s findings seem to weigh against a finding of incompetency. But given that L.J.T. was found–in the same proceeding–to be incompetent to stand trial, he would appear to face an impossibly uphill battle proving that he was nonetheless competent to meet the “somewhat higher standard” to proceed without the assistance of counsel. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 172 (2008).
