State v. Glen Michael Braun, 2022AP1764, 2/25/25, District III (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
In a case demonstrating the tough hill that litigants must climb to prove an officer lacks reasonable suspicion, COA affirms an order denying Braun’s suppression motion based on a possible equipment violation.
Braun’s vehicle attracted unwanted attention when he appeared to “dramatically” reduce his speed upon spotting a cop car. (¶3). In response, the Trooper began following Braun. (Id.). While doing so, the Trooper later claimed that: (1) he was “unable to read” the license plate because of “peeling paint” and (2) the registration decal was in an improper location on the license plate. (¶4).
As a result, the Trooper initiated a traffic stop. (¶6). However, as the Trooper’s vehicle came within 45 feet of Braun’s car, the Trooper was able to read the rear license plate. (Id.). The stop continued, resulting in an arrest for an OWI. (Id.).
Braun moved to suppress and alleged an unreasonable seizure. (¶5). He introduced a photograph of his license plate, taken during the daytime, which the circuit court found “pretty easy to read.” (Id.). However, the Trooper insisted that the peeling paint interfered with the license plate’s reflective qualities and therefore made it difficult to read at night. (Id.).
The circuit court concluded that the misplaced registration decal did not justify the stop. (¶7). However, it credited the Trooper’s testimony about the license plate and concluded the Trooper had reasonable suspicion that an equipment violation had been committed. (Id.).
On appeal, Braun renews arguments stemming from his reading of § 341.15(2), which reads:
Registration plates shall be attached firmly and rigidly in a horizontal position and conspicuous place. The plates shall at all times be maintained in a legible condition and shall be so displayed that they can be readily and distinctly seen and read. Any peace officer may require the operator of any vehicle on which plates are not properly displayed to display such plates as required by this section.
COA affirms for two reasons. First, the circuit court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous, as it relied on the Trooper’s testimony that he could not read the license plate during his initial observation of the car. (¶13).
Second, COA also rejects Braun’s statutory construction argument, which hinges on Braun’s claim that he did not technically violate the statute, as his license plate was eventually readable by the officer. (¶14). However, COA believes Braun is asking the court to resolve the wrong question. The question is not whether Braun definitively violated the law; rather, COA is concerned with whether the Trooper reasonably believed he did. (¶15). Here, the statute requires the plate to be “readily and distinctly seen and read.” (¶16). Thus, rather than reading any distance requirement into the statute, as Braun argues, COA is satisfied that the Trooper reasonably believed the plate was unlawful because he failed to read it at one point during his observation of Braun’s car. (¶18). “The fact that [the Trooper] was later able to make out the license plate’s characters does not render the stop […] unconstitutional, even if that fact rendered Braun in compliance with [the statute].” (¶18).
