Brown County v. L.M.R., 2023AP2314, District III, 8/6/24 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
COA rejects all of L.M.R.’s challenges raising commonly-litigated appellate issues and affirms in this Chapter 51 case given some less-than favorable facts.
This is an appeal of an initial commitment order entered in 2022 after “Luke” was found wandering the street naked unable to recall when he last ate or drank and claiming not to have slept for two consecutive nights. (¶2). On appeal, he presents the following issues:
Sufficiency of the Evidence for Commitment Order
Here, the County’s evidence included testimony that it was below freezing and that Luke appeared “oblivious” to the risky nature of his decision to go naked under these circumstances. (¶18). That evidence supports a finding that Luke’s conduct created a “substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself” and therefore dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. (Id.).
D.J.W. Findings
Next, Luke argues that the circuit court’s oral ruling was insufficiently specific because it did not “explicitly identify any of the standards of dangerousness set forth” in the statutes. (¶20). However, COA holds that the circuit court is not required to “explicitly recite the exact statutory subdivision of dangerousness or to exactly quote the statutory language.” (¶21). Here, the circuit court’s oral remarks made clear which statutory subsection it was relying on and there does not appear to have been any confusion on this point in this appeal; accordingly, COA holds there is no D.J.W. violation. (¶22).
Sufficiency of Evidence for Medication Order
Luke’s sole argument on this point is that the County did not prove he received a sufficient explanation of the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to medication. (¶28). While Luke focuses on the testimony of the examining doctor, he fails to address the sufficiency of the information conveyed in that doctor’s report, which was admitted into evidence. (¶32). COA appears to view this as an implied concession and holds that the information in the report was sufficient. (Id.).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Luke also argues that the circuit court erroneously denied him a hearing on his postdisposition motion alleging IAC based on a failure to object to hearsay evidence. (¶23). The circuit court denied the motion, asserting that if hearsay was admitted, it was “harmless error.” (¶26). On appeal, COA concludes Luke has not sufficiently pleaded prejudice, as the record was otherwise sufficient to prove Luke’s dangerousness. (¶27).
This portion of the decision might warrant a motion for reconsideration. After all, the prejudice test applicable to IAC is analytically distinct from both the harmless error analysis and the sufficiency of the evidence inquiry.
