Wood County v. P.J.L., 2024AP2098-FT, 1/9/25, District IV (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
In a chapter 55 appeal arising from a somewhat unusual posture–a continued protective placement order following a jury trial–COA’s invocation of an exceedingly deferential standard of review results in affirmance.
P.J.L. has been under a protective placement since 2021. (¶5). He demanded a jury for his 2023 annual review. (Id.). Following the adverse jury verdict and entry of an order for continued protective placement, P.J.L. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. As COA acknowledges, however, the standard erects an unforgiving barrier to relief, under which COA is duty-bound to defer to the jury’s verdict and view the evidence most favorably toward sustaining that verdict. (¶8).
Incompetency
P.J.L. first argues that the County failed to meet the requirements of § 55.08(1)(b), requiring that the County prove he was “an adult who has been determined to be incompetent by a circuit court.” (¶11). P.J.L. argues that the statute requires the County to prove “incompetence as of the time of trial.” (Id.). Although COA acknowledges a statutory construction disagreement on this point, it assumes without deciding that P.J.L.’s interpretation is correct. (Id.).
As to the first disputed sub-element–whether P.J.L. had a “serious and persistent mental illness” or “other like incapacity”–COA accepts the doctor’s testimony that P.J.L. suffered from antisocial personality disorder, had a significant brain injury, and was an alcoholic. (¶15). As to whether P.J.L. had an “ability to receive and evaluate information,” such that he was unable to meet “the essential requirements for his physical health or safety,” COA summarizes the trial evidence and finds that it was sufficient to allow the jury to make the critical inference. (¶18). Finally, as to whether P.J.L.’s “need for assistance in decision-making or communication cannot be met effectively and less restrictively” through other services, COA acknowledges that the testimony was not as detailed on this prong. (¶20). Yet, taking the testimony as a whole, COA is satisfied the County did enough. (Id.). Although P.J.L. makes some persuasive arguments about other evidence in the record which contradict that finding, COA reminds the reader that its task is to defer to the evidence in the record which could support the verdict, as it was the jury’s job to weigh the overall evidence. (¶21).
Primary Need for Residential Care and Custody
With respect to this element under § 55.08(1)(a), P.J.L. again points to significant evidence in the record which undermines the County’s arguments. (¶25). Yet, COA holds that the jury was not required to weigh this evidence more heavily than evidence it identifies in the record which supports the eventual verdict. (Id.).
Substantial Risk of Serious Harm
P.J.L.’s final sufficiency argument focuses on the dangerousness criterion in § 55.08(1)(c). Once again, P.J.L. identifies numerous pieces of record evidence supporting his argument that dangerousness was unproven at trial. Yet, as with his other sufficiency arguments, COA affirms under a deferential standard of review and review of the overall record evidence. (¶29).
Separate from his sufficiency challenges, P.J.L. also argues that the circuit court failed to make sufficient post-verdict findings, as required by § 55.18(3)(e)1. (¶34). Although COA acknowledges that this argument presents an interesting question of statutory construction as to whether this statute even applies in cases involving a trial by jury, it ultimately holds that P.J.L. has failed to adequately develop the argument and therefore affirms. (¶36).
