Racine County v. C.D.B., 2024AP1195, 2/5/25, District II (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
In “Banks’s” most recent appeal, he once again challenges the sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to his extension and medication orders. Like his last appeal, however, those arguments go nowhere.
Less than a year ago, we posted on “Banks’s” challenge to his extension and medication orders. Undeterred by his loss, Banks now appeals his most recent extension order. COA affirms on all fronts:
Sufficient Evidence of Dangerousness
Banks faces continued commitment due primarily to his 2014 conduct, in which he apparently stole a car and engaged in a high-speed chase. (¶20). Although Banks tries to challenge whether this conduct was proven to be sufficiently dangerous, COA gives that argument a frosty reception because it already rejected an identical argument in his previous appeal. (Id.).
Likewise, COA rejects Banks’s arguments relying on a lack of dangerous conduct before or after the 2014 incident. (¶21). COA holds that this is precisely why the recommitment standard exists and there is no requirement that the County submit evidence of dangerousness other than this decade-old conduct. (Id.). COA similarly rejects Banks’s arguments that the circuit court based its recommitment order on “speculative inferences” and canvasses the record for testimony which adequately proves “that if the commitment and medication and treatment orders are not extended, Banks would cease taking the necessary medications, creating a substantial probability he would decompensate and again engage in dangerous conduct.” (¶25).
Medication Order
Banks also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the medication order, relying primarily on SCOW’s decision in Melanie L.(¶26). After a detailed summary of the County’s evidence, COA rejects any argument that the doctor’s testimony lacked sufficient explanatory detail. (¶29). It therefore rejects Banks’s argument that the explanation of medication given to Banks was infirm because it failed to track guidance provided by Wisconsin DHS as to side effects of medication. In COA’s view, the argument is not properly before the court because it has been raised for the first time on appeal and, in any case, it faults Banks for not identifying legal authority which would require this level of detail. (¶32). Likewise, Banks’s argument that alternatives to medication were inadequately discussed is insufficiently briefed and raised for the first time on appeal, as well. (¶33). Finally, COA rejects Banks’s reliance on the recent J.D.B. decision, which it believes is distinguishable based on the unique facts of that case, as it dealt with the adequacy of a proposed treatment plan in context of a challenged medication order under a different statutory scheme. (¶34).
Hearsay
Banks also challenges the testimony of the case manager with respect to Banks’s 2014 conduct, asserting it was hearsay. (¶35). COA finds it unnecessary to reach the merits, however, as any hearsay testimony was harmless given other evidence in the record about that same conduct. (Id.)
