Sheboygan County v. L.L., 2024AP1443, 2/26/25, District II (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
COA confronts the usual challenges to a recommitment order and affirms based on a somewhat novel legal theory–that L.L.’s earlier stipulation to a commitment order undermines her sufficiency challenge to the recommitment.
D.J.W. Claim
“Lucy” first attacks her recommitment order by claiming that the circuit court failed to abide by SCOW’s D.J.W. mandate with respect to both prongs of the test (as refined, subsequently, by COA) requiring a court to: (1) correctly cite an applicable dangerousness standard and (2) make specific factual findings supporting that dangerousness finding. (¶21). As COA has held in a series of unpublished cases, the legal test is meant to require some degree of analytical specify on the part of the circuit court. (Id.).
Here, the circuit court “did not specifically refer to any of the statutory standards for dangerousness in its oral ruling.” (¶22). However, COA holds that the circuit court’s written order, which identified a statutory dangerousness criterion, in conjunction with the overall record evidence (including the remainder of the court’s oral ruling and the testimony of the doctor which clearly identified the dangerousness standard at issue) is sufficient to avoid a technical D.J.W. violation. (Id.).
In other words, COA has searched the record to supplement the court’s deficient oral ruling. Is this a harmless error analysis by a different name?
As to factual findings, Lucy argues that the circuit court’s oral ruling failed to track the elements of the first dangerousness standard, “a substantial probability of physical harm to himself or herself as manifested by evidence of recent threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm.” (¶23). However, COA is satisfied that the circuit court said enough and it broadly reads the court’s comments about the risks of drug use and references to lack of treatment as a sufficient engagement with the statutory elements. (Id.).
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Here, the County’s argument was that, if treatment ceased, Lucy would display dangerous behaviors like those leading to her initial commitment. (¶26). Lucy, however, maintains that the record is deficient because there was a lack of evidence regarding the nature of those dangerous behaviors. (Id.). In essence, she argues that the County needed to present admissible (non-hearsay) testimony about the original dangerous acts if it was attempting to prove the likelihood of that behavior’s recurrence. (Id.).
COA, however, points out that Lucy stipulated to the initial commitment order, thereby conclusively conceding “that she had, in fact, made statements threatening suicide and that they provided a sufficient basis for the initial determination of dangerousness.” (¶27). That stipulation, coupled with the expert’s testimony about Lucy’s amenability to treatment and likelihood of decompensation should treatment cease, was sufficient evidence to enter this recommitment order. (¶28).
Another recent D2 appeal recently raised important questions about the role of stipulations in Chapter 51 proceedings. This case shows further ramifications of such a stipulation. Effectively, Lucy’s initial stipulation–which would not have required any colloquy prior to acceptance–now operates to forever bar her ability to litigate her dangerousness in recommitment proceedings. Thus, not only was her present dangerousness never proven via testimonial evidence at an initial hearing, but also the County needs only to point to that stipulation in perpetuity to establish her “future” dangerousness during future recommitment proceedings. Is this yet another potential due process ramification that arises when the court system allows mentally ill persons to voluntarily stipulate to involuntary mental commitments?
