Winnebago County v. B.R.C., 2023AP1842, 2/14/24, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
In quite the head-scratcher, the court of appeals rejects a D.J.W. “specific factual findings” claim while acknowledging that such claims “are multiplying and it is clear that all sides could benefit from clarity on the point.” (Emphasis added). The court then proceeds to offer a step-by-step guide guide for circuit courts to make D.J.W. findings that will be “less likely to be overturned on appeal.” While the circuit court’s findings at issue don’t come close to any such model of clarity, the court holds that they were “sufficient” to allow the court conduct a “meaningful review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion and the evidence presented at the hearing.” Op., ¶21.
Getting right to the point, the circuit court’s “specific factual findings” that were sufficient for the court of appeals can be found at paragraph 9 in the decision. In its findings, the court noted that it heard testimony from Dr. Bales, B.R.C. (“Brooke”), and Brooke’s parents, and that it was “[r]elying heavily upon” Dr. Bales’ testimony. With regard to dangerousness, the court found that Brooke’s judgment is “grossly impaired,” that she “has had recent episodes of spiritually grandiose thinking, paranoid delusions. The testimony today is clear that she is a danger to herself or others, so the County has met the burden unde rboth the A and the B standards.” Op., ¶9. That’s about it.
Compare the trial court’s findings with the guide offered by the court of appeals “that each trial court in a mental commitment rotation should take when issuing findings and conclusions:
First the court should set out what it looked at and what it heard to form the basis for its opinion (e.g., the court has heard from expert X, witnesses Y and Z, and the subject individual, and has reviewed the following documents). Next, the court should summarize the testimony that supports (or does not support) a finding of mental illness, dangerousness, and treatability and state which witnesses it found to be credible. With respect to dangerousness, the court should clearly state which paragraph(s) the County is seeking to establish dangerousness under as well as which paragraph(s) the court finds to be applicable; these may not necessarily be the same. The court should also tie the evidence to the standard (e.g., witness Y indicated that he was in fear of his safety, witness Z heard the individual make suicidal statements, or the subject individual told the expert that a particular event took place). The more detailed the better (as well as the less likely to be overturned on appeal). Finally, the trial court should read out loud the factual findings and conclusions contained in the standard order form for commitment orders and involuntary administration of medication and treatment orders. Op., ¶18.
The court’s application of D.J.W. to Brooke’s case is strained: “The court explained that Brooke’s disorder ‘is grossly impairing her judgment as well as her behavior and her capacity to recognize reality.’ Then, it itemized the concerning behavior: ‘She has had recent episodes of spiritually grandiose thinking, paranoid delusions.’ This spiritually grandiose reference, albeit not a recitation of the exact testimony, obviously relates to a large portion of Brooke’s mother’s testimony.” Op., ¶20. The court of appeals then summarizes Brooke’s mother’s testimony and concludes that the trial court’s findings “surely are sufficient, when taken with the reasonable inferences from the record, to conclude that there were specific factual findings.” Op., ¶21.
Immediately thereafter, within the context of agreeing with Brooke that the “there is no basis for the [county’s] forfeiture argument,” the court opines that:
civil litigation, in particular in cases of mental commitment, is not a game; litigants should not be holding back on asking trial courts to make complete and proper records and findings. The extraordinarily large influx of appeals in mental commitment cases is starting to overwhelm the appellate court system. All parties, and the trial courts, should be taking great pains to ensure that rulings are supported by admissible evidence and the appropriate factual findings are stated in full on the record. Op., ¶22.
We’ve addressed Judge Lazar’s specific point before. While petitioners and circuit courts surely should be encouraged to follow D.J.W., which Judge Grogan just recently explained is “neither complicated nor difficult to understand,” individuals subject to petitions for involuntary civil commitment, and their attorneys, share no such burden to shore up the record on appeal such that their commitments are “less likely to be overturned on appeal.”
The court thereafter proceeds to conclude there was sufficient evidence of dangerousness and sufficient evidence that Brooke is incompetent to refuse medication and treatment. Op., ¶¶23-35.
