COA rejects novel plea withdrawal claim in TPR; finds evidence sufficient dad didn’t comply with CHIPS conditions

State v. D.K., 2023AP292-293, 1/3/24, District I (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Despite a novel challenge as to the integrity of his plea, COA rejects “Daniel’s” arguments and affirms in this TPR appeal.

Daniel’s legal troubles began when DMCPS received information that he had physically abused his nine-month old child, Corey. (¶2). As a result, Corey and his sister Alice were ultimately removed from the home, a CHIPS action was commenced, and Daniel faced “criminal child abuse charges.” (Id.). Ultimately, the State initiated a TPR action. (¶4). While those petitions were pending, Daniel made repeated requests to increase visitation with the children which were denied by the circuit court. (¶5). He also asked the court to make a finding that DMCPS had not made reasonable efforts to provide services given the lack of progress toward increased visitation; that request was also denied. (Id.).

Although the case was in a trial posture, Daniel ultimately pleaded no contest to the ground of continuing CHIPS. (¶6). In exchange, the State agreed to adjourn the dispositional hearing and allow the additional visitation Daniel had tried to obtain pretrial. (Id.). The court ultimately terminated his parental rights. (¶8).

On appeal, Daniel argues that his right to procedural due process was violated. (¶11). The argument goes like this: He was previously denied services (additional placement) before ultimately stipulating to the continuing CHIPS ground, thereby conceding that reasonable efforts had been made to provide services. (Id.). However, the about-face following his plea–permitting him to have the additional placement he was previously denied–creates an unacceptable tension according to Daniel. If placement is now being permitted, then how was the prior denial reasonable? And isn’t it a little bizarre to condition the provision of services on a stipulation that the prior denial of same was reasonable? (We know this argument is conceptually a little difficult, but we’re doing our best here).

Ultimately, COA is unwilling to enter these philosophical weeds. As to due process, the TPR procedure already accommodates a broad suite of protections; as Daniel does not dispute that all of those requirements (including notice, the right to counsel, etc) were satisfied, COA isn’t willing to stretch the definition of due process to fit in his novel argument. (¶14). Daniel could have had a trial and chose not to; instead making a “strategic decision” to plead and try to build up visitation prior to a dispositional hearing.  (¶16). Moreover, the overall record at the prove-up establishes that reasonable efforts were made, notwithstanding this particular sub-argument about placement. (¶17).

Having rejected Daniel’s plea claim, COA then makes short work of his claim that the evidence at the prove-up was insufficient to support the court’s finding as to grounds. (¶19). While the circuit court relied on Daniel’s refusal to admit responsibility for abusing Corey, Daniel argues this did not actually violate any of the enumerated CHIPS conditions and thus could not support the grounds finding. (Id.). Applying a super-deferential standard of review, COA disagrees and holds that Daniel’s refusal t0 accept responsibility is encompassed by the condition “Supervise Your Child and Place Your Child’s Needs Before Your Own.” (¶22). Admitting responsibility, in the circuit court’s view, was “foundational” to meeting this condition; COA is unwilling to disturb that “logical” interpretation of the evidence on appeal. (¶23).