City of Rhinelander v. Zachary Tyler LaFave-LaCrosse, 2020AP1120 & 1121, 1/7/25, District III (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
LaCrosse appeals pro se from the circuit court judgments, entered after a bench trial, convicting him of first-offense operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) and refusing to submit to a chemical test for intoxication. COA rejects all his arguments and affirms.
At the bench trial, a Rhinelander police officer testified that she saw a car in a snowbank at 2:35 a.m., and LaCrosse got out of the car when she pulled up. LaCrosse’s breath smelled of intoxicants, he had “slow and slurred speech,” and he admitted that he was coming from a bar where he’d “had a couple drinks.” (¶2). The officer asked him to perform field sobriety tests, and administered three tests. The tests revealed multiple clues of intoxication. LaCrosse refused a PBT. The officer arrested him, took him to the jail and read him the Informing the Accused form, asked for a chemical test of his breath, and LaCrosse again refused. (¶3).
LaCrosse also testified at trial. He claimed that his mother was the driver and that she had walked home to get her boyfriend so he could pull the car out of the ditch. (¶4). He also explained that he was from Arizona, and didn’t know that Wisconsin was an implied consent state. (¶5). The circuit court found LaCrosse’s testimony incredible and concluded that he was the driver. The court further found that the officer properly read the Informing the Accused form to LaCrosse and that LaCrosse refused the test.
On appeal LaCrosse challenges both citations on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. (¶10). COA concludes that the city met its burden because the evidence that LaCrosse drove or operated the vehicle, though circumstantial, was strong, and the circuit court made reasonable inferences. (¶13). LaCrosse next argues that there were several problems with the field sobriety tests. (¶15). In response, COA seems to consider both whether the officer lacked reasonable probable cause to arrest LaCrosse, and whether the evidence was sufficient for the court to conclude that LaCrosse was intoxicated. (¶¶16-19). Regardless, COA rejects these arguments as undeveloped and concludes there was sufficient evidence of LaCrosse’s intoxication.
As to the refusal, COA understands LaCrosse to argue: (1) he did not understand the implied consent law in Wisconsin because he is from Arizona; and (2) the officer did not read him the Informing the Accused form until after he refused the PBT request. (¶21). COA rejects LaCrosse’s first argument because the circuit court found that the officer properly read him the form, which “is meant to inform the accused of the law in Wisconsin and the consequences of refusing the test.” (¶22). Second, the officer read LaCrosse the form at the proper time–after his arrest but before requesting a chemical test of his breath. (¶23).
