State v. Craig A. Swope, 2008 WI App 175
For Swope: Dianne M. Erickson
Issue: Whether an FBI agent’s expert opinion, that the simultaneous deaths of an elderly couple were the result of homicide rather than natural causes, was improperly based on hearsay, namely the opinions of two non-testifying experts who thought the likelihood of natural causes so remote as to be impossible.
Holding:
¶35 In State v. Watson, 227 Wis. 2d 167, 195, 595 N.W.2d 403 (1999), the supreme court explained: “In Kolpin v. Pioneer Power & Light, 162 Wis. 2d 1, 37, 469 N.W.2d 595 (1991), we stated that ‘even if [the expert] arguably relied on hearsay in forming [the expert’s] opinion, [the expert’s] opinion is still admissible.’” We note, however, that
[Wisconsin Stat. §] 907.03 is not a hearsay exception. Hearsay data upon which the expert’s opinion is predicated may not be automatically admitted into evidence by the proponent and used for the truth of the matter asserted unless the data are otherwise admissible under a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. (Citation omitted.)
State v. Weber, 174 Wis. 2d 98, 107, 496 N.W.2d 762 (Ct. App. 1993).
¶36 Safarik was asked to analyze all of the evidence from the Recob home to determine if their simultaneous death was naturally or criminally caused—the medical examiner had ruled out accident or suicide. Naturally, he would seek out information on simultaneous death by natural causes to test his hypothesis that the deaths were the result of a crime. The statistics relied upon by Christakis of Harvard and Anderson of the CDC were not admitted into evidence; rather, they served to illustrate the basis for the opinion they shared that it was statistically impossible for a couple to suffer simultaneous death from natural causes—an opinion Safarik took into consideration when reaching his conclusion that death was by a criminal act. See Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1270-71 (7th Cir. 1988) (The trial court may, in its discretion, allow an expert to testify to otherwise inadmissible facts for the limited purpose of serving as a basis of the expert’s opinion.). The trial court did not err in permitting Safarik to rely upon the opinions of Christakis and Anderson.
Nor, the court adds, does the underlying hearsay violate confrontation, ¶37, citing State v. Barton, 2006 WI App 18 (overarching principle summarized as: “confrontation rights were not impinged because the hearsay opinions of others were not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted but as the basis of the expert’s testimony”).
