State v. Jayden Adams, 2023AP218-CR, 7/23/24, District 1 (recommended for publication); case activity
Adams appealed a nonfinal order denying his motion for discovery prior to his Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1) preliminary examination and his motion for reverse waiver to juvenile court. Despite holding that juvenile defendants have a limited right to discovery before a prelim under State v. Klesser, 2010 WI 88, 328 Wis. 2d 42, 786 N.W.2d 144, the COA concludes that Adams was not entitled to the discovery he requested in this case. The COA also concludes that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying the reverse waiver.
Adams was involved in a car break-in that turned violent confrontation with the car’s owner, when he was 13 years old. (¶4).When the vehicle’s owner chased after Adams and his friends, Adams got into the driver’s seat, hit the owner in the face with the car door, and then ran over her body multiple times and drove away dragging her. (¶4). The victim died of her injuries. Adams and his friends also drove to a store in the car where they used the victim’s credit card. (¶5).
The state charged Adams with first-degree reckless homicide as a party to a crime. Because of this charge and Adams’s age at the time of the alleged offense, the adult criminal court had exclusive original jurisdiction of the case under § 938.183(1)(am).(¶5). Adams requested a prelim under § 970.032(1) and moved for discovery prior to the hearing. He sought “police reports, body worn camera and squad camera audio-visual recordings, surveillance video, photographs, audio-visual recordings of statements made by witnesses, alleged co-actors, and the child defendant, and Milwaukee County Medical Examiner reports” so as to attempt to negate the homicide charge (and therefore get out of adult criminal court). (¶6).
The circuit court denied Adams’s discovery motion, held a multi-day prelim, and found probable cause. (¶7). The court then held a multi-day reverse waiver hearing under § 970.032(2). (¶8). Adams called six witnesses who testified about Adams’s life, his forensic evaluation, and correctional programs and treatment options available t0 juvenile offenders depending on whether they are prosecuted through the adult criminal or juvenile justice systems. (¶8).
Pre-preliminary examination discovery
The COA first addresses jurisdiction over Adams’s discovery claim. It concludes that it has jurisdiction to consider the circuit court’s oral denial of Adams’s discovery motion because he appealed from the written order denying his motion for reverse waiver, which encompasses the denial of his discovery motion. (¶¶15-17). The court moves on to the merits of Adams’s discovery claim. Discovery orders are ordinarily reviewed for an erroneous exercise of discretion, but the interpretation and application of statutes and case law present questions of law, which appellate courts review independently. Sands v. Whitnall Sch. Dist., 2008 WI 89, ¶14, 312 Wis. 2d 1, 754 N.W.2d 439. The court then examined Kleser:
the Kleser court went into detail about the difference between a preliminary examination under § 970.032(1) and a preliminary examination under Wis. Stat. § 970.03. Kleser, 328 Wis. 2d 42, ¶¶53-66. It explained that in contrast to § 970.03(1) preliminary examinations, where the court must find probable cause that “some felony has been committed by the defendant[,]” § 970.032(1) preliminary examinations require the court to find probable cause that the juvenile has committed “‘the violation’ of which he or she is accused in the criminal complaint.” Kleser, 328 Wis. 2d 42, ¶¶55-57. The different language reflects a significant difference in purpose because “[t]his finding is required not only to protect the juvenile from hasty, improvident, or malicious prosecution, but also to assure that the criminal court has ‘exclusive original jurisdiction’ of the juvenile by virtue of the juvenile’s probable violation of one of the [enumerated offenses].” Id., ¶57. . . . in § 970.032(1) preliminary examinations, “the defendant must be given some latitude in attacking the specific offense charged if a successful attack would alter the crime charged or negate the exclusive original jurisdiction of the criminal court.” Kleser, 328 Wis. 2d 42, ¶65.
(¶19).
Further:
The Kleser court did not explicitly mention a right to discovery prior to a Wis. Stat. § 970.032(1) preliminary examination, but it did repeatedly emphasize the importance of the juvenile defendant’s right to present evidence to negate or reduce the original jurisdiction charge, and it explained that the § 970.032(1) preliminary examination is the only opportunity during reverse waiver proceedings for presenting such evidence. Kleser, 328 Wis. 2d 42, ¶¶62, 84. That is, such evidence cannot be offered during the reverse waiver hearing under § 970.032(2).
Given “this unique legal framework,” the court of appeals concludes that defendants are entitled to evidence that the state intends to introduce at the prelim to establish probable cause of the alleged jurisdictional offense. (¶22). The state must produce this evidence at a reasonable time before the prelim. (¶22). The court recognizes that there may be other discoverable materials exclusively in the possession of the state, provided the defendant “establishes a particularized need for the materials requested by showing that they are likely to be relevant to negate one of the elements of the charged jurisdictional offense.” (¶22). The court observes, however, that hearsay is admissible in juvenile prelims. (¶23).
Juveniles are entitled to “something” so that they may have a meaningful “right to attempt to negate that specific [jurisdictional] offense during the preliminary examination—to prevent the [S]tate from prevailing on the specific offense charged, or possibly, to deprive the criminal court of its ‘exclusive original jurisdiction.’” (¶¶24-25) (citing Kleser, 328 Wis. 2d 42, ¶60). However, the prelim was not intended to be a minitrial. (¶26). Because the materials Adams sought were not introduced by the state, and Adams did not explain how any of the requested materials would have been likely to negate the first-degree reckless homicide charge (because, as he argues, how could he know all of his defenses without seeing the discovery?), the court affirms the denial of Adams’s request.
Reverse Waiver
Adams argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion. (¶29). Appellate courts “will affirm a discretionary decision if the circuit court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.” Kleser, 328 Wis. 2d 42, ¶37. The COA is required to “look for reasons to sustain” a discretionary decision. State v. Verhagen, 198 Wis. 2d 177, 191, 542 N.W.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1995).
Wis. Stat. § 970.032(2) provides that the court shall retain adult criminal court jurisdiction unless the juvenile proves by a preponderance of the evidence all of the following: (a) That, if convicted, the juvenile could not receive adequate treatment in the criminal justice system. (b) That transferring jurisdiction to the court assigned to
exercise jurisdiction under … [ch.] 938 would not depreciate the seriousness of the offense. (c) That retaining jurisdiction is not necessary to deter the juvenile or other juveniles from committing the violation of which the juvenile is accused …. (¶30).
The COA concludes that, based on the evidence, the circuit court’s findings were reasonable. Specifically, as to the first factor, Adams failed to demonstrate that he could not receive adequate treatment in the criminal justice system. (¶33). As to the second factor, it was not improper for the circuit court to consider the tragedy to the victim’s family and their consistent presence in court when evaluating whether reverse waiver would depreciate the seriousness of the offense. (¶35).
