State v. K.R.W., 2024AP1210, 2/19/25, District II (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Although COA does not address K.R.W.’s broader constitutional argument, it holds that suppression is warranted given the State’s violation of a statute requiring an intake worker to warn a juvenile of his right to counsel and right against self-incrimination before taking that juvenile’s statement.
K.R.W. was arrested at school following a fight between a group of middle schoolers. (¶3). After his arrest, K.R.W. promptly requested a lawyer. (Id.). Because he had invoked his right to counsel, police understood that they could not interview K.R.W. about the underlying incident while in custody. (Id.). Under the juvenile code, however, an intake worker was required to meet with K.R.W. and ascertain whether he “would remain in custody or if he could be released.” (¶4).
Notably, the legislature has mandated that, before such an interview occurs, the intake worker must advise the juvenile about their right to counsel and right against self-incrimination. (Id). The intake worker did not abide by this statutory mandate and, in the ensuing conversation, K.R.W. confessed to the underlying offense. (Id.). The intake worker testified about that conversation during K.R.W.’s court trial. (¶7). The circuit court denied K.R.W.’s motion to suppress, believing the intake worker was not legally required to provide the warnings outlined in the statute. (¶10).
On appeal, COA finds that the statute at issue plainly instructs that the intake worker “shall” provide the described warnings. (¶15). In light of this record, the intake worker “clearly” violated this textual command. (¶17).
While the statute does not list suppression as a remedy, COA finds the legislature’s partial incorporation of the Miranda rule as suggestive evidence that the legislature intended “that the remedy for this statutory violation should mirror the remedy for a Miranda violation.” (¶18). Accordingly, COA believes there is “no question” the statements should have been suppressed. (¶21). However, COA must still conduct a harmless error inquiry. Applying the requisite test, COA cannot conclude the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore reverses. (¶26).
