Marinette County v. C.R.J., 2023AP1695-FT, 4/16/24, District III (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
C.R.J. (“Caleb”) challenged his commitment on two fronts: (1) the circuit court’s failure to comply with Langlade County v. D.J.W.’s “specific factual findings” mandate and (2) the county failed to introduce sufficient evidence of dangerousness under either standard. After critiquing the circuit court’s factual findings, the court agrees with Caleb that insufficient evidence existed to involuntarily commit him.
Once again, this Chapter 51 appeal presents a sad set of facts that demonstrate the false equivalency between mental illness and dangerousness sufficient to in voluntarily commit. According to the decision, Caleb was arrested for “acting odd, swearing, [and] yelling about vampires and werewolves.” In jail, Caleb continued this behavior and threw things in his cell. After Caleb refused to interact with a crisis worker, the jail transferred Caleb to a hospital. Asked if he was suicidal, Caleb stated that he was not, but then offered a presumably delusional explanation for why two deputies should “[j]ust shoot me…” Op., ¶4. Caleb thereafter “talked about wanting to die” and about the “Garden of Eden.” The crisis worker initiated an emergency detention out of her concern that Caleb “would inadvertently kill himself.”
At Caleb’s final hearing, one doctor testified that Caleb was dangerous because he claimed to have “drunk his own urine,” which can lead to excess sodium and can introduce bacteria into one’s system. Another doctor testified that Caleb refused to talk to him and that Caleb threw a drink “across the hallway,” which the doctor characterized as “threatening,” but that he didn’t know “if you would consider that dangerous.” Op., ¶9. This doctor also opined that Caleb was at risk to harm himself based on Caleb “wanting law enforcement to shoot him.” The doctor described this behavior as “positive views” on being killed and that “people with psychosis are a high-risk group, and, theoretically, if symptoms are reduced, then the leval of risk is reduced.” Op., ¶10.
The circuit court found Caleb dangerous and expressed regret “that we have many cases of suicide by cop.” The court also referenced the “negative biological effects” of Caleb drinking his own urine. On its written order, the court court checked the boxes relating to the first and second standards of dangerousness: Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a. and b. While the court of appeals takes some time to explain how the circuit court failed to make specific factual findings regarding Caleb’s alleged dangerous under the second standard (harm to others), the court ultimately assumes without deciding that the circuit court’s findings were sufficient under the first standard (harm to self). Op., ¶¶17-20.
Regardless of the circuit court’s factual findings, though, the court agrees with Caleb that the courty failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he was dangerous under the first standard. The county argued that Caleb was dangerous to himself under the “suicide by cop” theory, but the court notes that the only reference to “suicide by cop” came not from the county’s witnesses or evidence, but from the circuit court’s ruling. The court points out that there was no evidence Caleb acted on his “just shoot me” comment and there was no other evidence of suicidal threats or attempts from Caleb. While the court concedes that Caleb’s declarations that he wanted to die may have been credible, it bases its decision on the statute, which requires “threats, or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harmn that make it much more likely than not that Caleb is a danger to himself.” Op., ¶25.
The court also disagrees that the evidence about Caleb drinking his own urine amounted to an attempt at suicide or serious bodily harm that made it much more likely than not that Caleb is physically dangerous to himself. Therefore, the circuit court’s finding to the contrary was clearly erroneous. Op., ¶26.
