Monroe County v. M.C., 2024AP924, 12/12/24, District IV (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s commitment order under Chapter 51 where the court did not make sufficient factual findings to support its conclusion that M.C. was dangerous, as required by D.J.W.
Police issued a statement of emergency detention for M.C. under Chapter 51 after she allegedly took her son’s medication for bipolar disorder. The case proceeded to a commitment hearing, at which two experts and M.C. testified.
Dr. Michael Lace testified that M.C. suffered from mania and delusions and that she told him she “accidentally” ingested her son’s medication. (¶¶ 10-11). The doctor reported that M.C. did not have suicidal thoughts or delusions, but “talked about some passive suicidal thinking” such as “if [she were to die], that would be okay with her, but she wasn’t . . . going to actively pursue suicide.” (¶ 11). Dr. Lace said he did not “have a huge concern” about M.C.’s “passive suicidal thoughts” and answered “no” when asked if M.C. threatened suicide. However, he checked a box in his report indicating that he determined M.C. was “dangerous” because there was a “substantial probability” that M.C. would harm herself. (¶ 11). Dr. Lace said when M.C. was manic and experienced delusions “she could be misinterpreted by other people or she could misinterpret their intentions and put herself in a dangerous situation.” (¶ 12). But the doctor did not provide examples of any particular “dangerous situations.” Dr. Lace was also concerned with M.C.’s ability to care for herself due to her delusions; specifically, that she might skip meals or forget “to do certain things while she was in a manic state.” (¶ 13).
Dr. Leslie Taylor testified that M.C. told her she intentionally took her son’s medication and that the medication could cause harm if taken in a large dose. But the doctor did not indicate the dose ingested by M.C. Dr. Taylor said M.C. posted on Facebook that she did not want to live anymore because she felt threatened by other people, which had “something to do with allegations of past sexual assaults and a conspiracy by others to commit additional assaults.” (¶ 14). Dr. Taylor testified that M.C. taking her son’s pills and her Facebook post showed a substantial probability that M.C. would harm herself. (¶ 15).
M.C. testified that her Facebook post was not a suicide threat, but a “comment that was very immature to make.” (¶ 16). M.C. said she was not suicidal and that, although she thought she took her son’s medication, she in fact had not. (¶ 16).
The circuit court found that M.C. was mentally ill , a proper subject for treatment, and was dangerous because there was a substantial probability she would physically harm herself (§ 51.20(1)(a)2.a.) and a substantial probability she could physically harm herself or others through impaired judgment (§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c.). The court remarked that M.C. has five children and behavior such as taking her son’s medication could endanger them. (¶ 18).
M.C. appealed only the circuit court’s findings of dangerousness. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s commitment order because the County did not prove that M.C. was dangerous.
With regard to the circuit court’s conclusion that M.C. was substantially probable to harm herself, the Court noted there was no evidence that M.C. had recently attempted suicide and not sufficient evidence that she recently threatened suicide. (¶ 20). The Court considered Dr. Lace’s description of “passive suicidal thoughts” insufficient to meet the standard of dangerousness because the doctor testified that M.C. was not “actively pursuing her own death” and he “used only vague and general terms in an apparent attempt to suggest a mechanism through which M.C.’s passive suicidal thinking” could place her in dangerous situations: “This testimony did not include any examples or details, and the court did not make any specific findings expanding on what the court might have interpreted Dr. Lace to mean. This cannot be reasonably interpreted as clear and convincing evidence of a recent threat of suicide or seriously bodily harm to herself, and therefore the County has not shown that it is much more likely than not that M.C. was dangerous to herself or others.” (¶ 21). With regard to M.C.’s Facebook post, the Court observed that the circuit court did not make any finding about the post or that it might reflect M.C.’s intent to attempt suicide or serious bodily harm. And the circuit court did not make an express finding that M.C. in fact ingested her son’s medication or, if she did, that it would be reasonably interpreted as a suicide attempt. (¶ 24).
Regarding the circuit court’s conclusion that M.C. was substantially probable to physically harm herself or others through her impaired judgment, the Court found that the circuit court did not “identify a pattern of acts or omissions. Instead, the court provided a single ‘example’ of M.C.’s impaired judgment — that she allegedly took her son’s medication.”(¶ 26). But “dangerousness” under the third standard for commitment requires a “pattern of recent acts or omissions.” Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. The Court determined that the circuit court “made the generalized finding that M.C. ‘could’ be a danger to her children when in a manic state, but it did not explain in what way or ways, based on what particular evidence.” (¶ 28).
Finally, the Court noted that the record did not refer to whether a reasonable provision for M.C.’s and her family’s safety could be made in the community, or whether protective placement services could be provided under Chapter 55, which are required before a finding of dangerousness is made pursuant to § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. (¶ 30).
