St. Croix County v. B.T.C., 2023AP2085, 6/11/24, District III (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
In the second decision this week reversing a circuit court’s commitment order under Chapter 51, the COA concludes that respondent telling a police officer that he would “bring the chief to justice” not sufficient to establish the respondent is “dangerous.”
B.T.C. (referred to as “Bob” by the Court of Appeals) was arrested in St. Croix County after he allegedly told a police officer that he intended to “bring the [police] chief to justice.” Jail staff “became concerned about his mental state” and twice called crisis responders to perform assessments. After the first assessment, Bob was placed on suicide watch. During the second assessment, “Bob was reportedly unable to regulate his emotions, and he informed the case manager performing the assessment that he still wanted to bring the police chief to justice.” ¶ 3. The County then commenced proceedings to commit Bob pursuant to Chapter 51.
At the final commitment hearing, the case manager to the facts cited above and said “bringing someone to justice” is a “vague statement “ that “can mean a lot of different things.” ¶ 6. A psychiatrist who examined Bob testified that he suffers from an unspecified psychotic disorder and offered that Bob presented a danger to himself or others due to his “threat of harm to a police officer” and because “[t]here had been other incidents leading up to that.” ¶ 6. The psychiatrist relied on a criminal complaint against Bob, “which denoted several of these concerning incidents.” ¶ 6. The circuit court found clear and convincing evidence that Bob was mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and “dangerous” as defined by Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. The circuit court based its “dangerousness” finding on the psychiatrist’s report incorporating the criminal complaint: “[W]ith that context, bringing the chief to justice takes on a whole different meaning, one that is much more dark and sinister, and one that I think would reasonably bring ordinary individuals to fear for their safety.” ¶ 10.
The Court of Appeals reversed because the County did not meet its burden to show that Bob was dangerous, as defined by Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b., which requires proof that the person: “[e]vidences a substantial probability of physical harm to other individuals as manifested by evidence of recent homicidal or other violent behavior, or by evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear of physical harm to them, as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt, or threat to do serious physical harm.”
The court observed that the circuit court acknowledged Bob’s alleged threat was “vague” and relied on the psychiatrist’s report “to fill the void.” ¶ 14. While the report cited hearsay statements from a criminal complaint alleging “various concerning behaviors,” the report did not specify what occurred during these incidents and the complaint was not admitted into evidence at the final hearing: “[W]e are left with no context in which to evaluate Bob’s statement in our de novo review of dangerousness.” ¶ 15. The court was also concerned about relying on allegations in a complaint that were not “adjudicated as being true or accurate,” considering that the record did not show Bob was convicted in connection with the complaint. ¶ 16.
The court rejected the County’s argument that Bob’s statement about bringing the chief to justice, on its face, established “a threat to do serious physical harm.” Without context, the court determined, it could not “assess the objective legal standard of whether the ‘threat’ constituted one that would put others in reasonable fear of both violent behavior toward them and serious physical harm to them.” ¶ 17.
