Jared L. Spencer v. Michael Meisner, 21-cv-0326 (E.D. Wis. 4/26/24).
In an intriguing habeas win, the district court swats away the usual arguments about “reliance” and “harmlessness” in order to find that Spencer’s constitutional right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information was violated.
Spencer, who has a long history of mental health struggles, pleaded guilty to attempted first-degree intentional homicide. (p.6). In its comments, the court discussed Spencer’s alleged refusal of medication while in jail as a pertinent factor in its sentencing decision. (Id.).
As the district court’s statement of facts makes clear, this was inaccurate. In fact, the records rebut the court’s description of the situation and instead show that Spencer was “scrupulously following his doctor’s directions.” (p.12). However, his postconviction motion was denied without a hearing, as the circuit court believed any error was harmless. (p.8). Spencer appealed and the court of appeals also found the error harmless.
Because the state court did not address whether there was a reliance on inaccurate information, the district court therefore addresses those requirements applying de novo review. (p.10). Given the record before it, the district court wastes no time in finding the court’s comments about medication refusal inaccurate. (p.11).
As to reliance, “the sentencing court clearly gave explicit attention and specific consideration to the inaccurate information in imposing sentence.” (Id.). The district court therefore rejects a commonly invoked argument that there was no reliance because “other accurate information […] supported [the sentencing court’s] determination […].” (p.12). Instead, reliance is proven because Spencer “has shown that he was sentenced in substantial part on the basis of inaccurate information.” (Id.).
That leaves harmless error and the AEDPA standard. Here, the state court unreasonably applied the harmless error test because it “unreasonably considered only the effect of removing the inaccurate information and failed to consider the potential positive effect that accurate information could have on petitioner’s sentence.” (p.13). Because the true information “undermines the sentencing court’s rationale” the State cannot prove the error is harmless. (Id.).
Accordingly, Spencer is entitled to a new sentencing on remand.
