Waupaca County v. A.L.H., 2024AP1526, 1/30/25, District IV (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
While many litigators may have believed the issue of a remedy for a D.J.W. violation had been clarified by SCOW, COA holds that recent precedent does not preclude a circuit court from making the required findings during postconviction proceedings.
This is an appeal of a six-month initial commitment order entered in February of 2024. (¶4). With the expiration of that deadline presumably already looming by the time appellate counsel was appointed and had access to the transcripts, A.L.H. filed a postdisposition motion in June of 2024. (¶5). A.L.H.’s motion averred that the circuit court had failed to make appropriate dangerousness findings and therefore asked for outright vacatur of the underlying orders for commitment and involuntary medication. (Id.).
The County, however, proposed a different remedy and asked the circuit court to use the postdisposition hearing to supplement the record with the appropriate findings. (¶6). The circuit court accepted that invitation and made new findings based on the evidence submitted at the final hearing. (Id.).
On appeal, A.L.H. renews her argument that the circuit court was required to vacate the underlying orders and was not permitted to make new findings several months after the 14-day deadline for holding a final hearing had elapsed. (¶1). She cites SCOW’s recent decision in Walworth County v. M.R.M. for the proposition that, because the deadline for holding the final hearing had obviously lapsed by the time the postdisposition motion was filed, the circuit court could not effectively reopen the proceedings so as to do several months later what it was statutorily required to complete within 14 days of the individual’s detention. (¶1).
COA disagrees with A.L.H.’s reading of the relevant authorities. In its view, there are two relevant rules:
- “If an appellate court determines that the circuit court did not make the required factual findings regarding dangerousness, and the commitment or recommitment order being appealed has expired, then the appellate court must vacate the order because the circuit court has lost competency to conduct proceedings on remand.” (¶9). (Citing Sheboygan County v. M.W.)
- Second, a court can also lose competency if it fails to conduct the hearing within the 14-day deadline. (¶10). (Citing M.W.)
Essentially, COA holds that it is “undisputed” the final hearing was timely, the commitment order had not yet expired, and the circuit court did not receive new evidence but merely made new findings based on the evidence already adduced at the final hearing. (¶11). It claims that A.L.H.’s arguments are unsupported by controlling case law, and specifically finds that two unpublished cases seemingly supporting her reading are unpersuasive.(¶¶15-16).
COA further holds that the actions of the circuit court are impliedly authorized by the 809.30 procedure, which is designed to allow circuit courts to correct errors during postdisposition proceedings. (¶20). It therefore draws a distinction between receiving new evidence (which it believes to be impliedly disapproved of by 809.30’s rule that sufficiency challenges do not need to be made in the circuit court) and making new findings, based on already-existing record evidence. (Id.). While it leaves open the possibility that there are some circuit court actions which may cross the line, it holds that the court’s actions in this case were appropriate and authorized by law. (¶21).
To say that A.L.H. has a strong petition for review is a bit of an understatement. Essentially, COA reaches the result here by virtue of how it interprets SCOW’s decision in M.R.M. There, SCOW was asked to address whether it could remand for a new extension hearing after the appellant’s request for a jury trial had been unlawfully rejected. SCOW clarified that the competency question in that circumstance did not focus on whether there was time remaining on the existing extension order being challenged on appeal. Instead, it concluded that competency needed to be assessed from the perspective of the preceding order and unambiguously held that “the failure to enter a lawful extension order before the preceding order expires results in a loss of competency.” In other words, a court which “enters an unlawful extension order— by wrongfully denying a timely jury demand, for example—has not complied with” the statutory requirements governing the timing of such an order.
Thus, in M.R.M.’s case, the circuit court’s duty to timely hold a final hearing was not tolled by the legally defective proceedings; essentially, a finding that the extension order was legally defective had the same impact as if no extension order had been entered at all–meaning the court was clearly without competency to hold a “new” hearing outside those statutory deadlines.
Here, aside from the legal wrinkle that this is an original order, A.L.H. essentially loses for the unstated reason that COA is choosing to view a D.J.W. violation as materially different from an erroneously denied jury demand; if the two violations were on equal legal footing, the same outcome should have occurred here.
As the opinion points out, other decisions of COA have reached an opposite outcome. Moreover, it would appear that this decision once again threatens to undermine the force and effect of D.J.W. as it is difficult to square with the broad pronouncements in that decision regarding the importance of legally correct rulings in order to effectuate due process guarantees and ensure meaningful appellate review.
Long story short, this case seems like SCOW bait and we eagerly await the outcome of A.L.H.’s petition for review!
