S.G. v. Wisconsin DCF, 2024AP472, 4/3/25, District IV (recommended for publication); case activity
In a unique CHIPS appeal, COA clarifies the proper role of corporation counsel when another party files a CHIPS petition.
S.G. initiated this litigation by filing a CHIPS petition on her behalf under § 48.13(9). (¶10). In essence, S.G., who was receiving services under a TPR order, was about to turn 18 and needed the CHIPS order so she could continuing receiving those services until she turned 19. (Id.). The circuit court scheduled a hearing with the intent of completing both the plea and disposition prior to the expiration of the current orders. (¶11). DCF, the legal respondent in this action, was not objecting. (Id.).
Two days after the filing of the petition, however, Corporation Counsel got wind of these legal proceedings and asked that it be added as an “interested party” to the litigation pursuant to § 48.09(5). (¶12). It then moved to dismiss S.G.’s petition, alleging multiple legal theories. (Id.). The circuit court then authorized Corporation Counsel “to act as a party” in this CHIPS proceeding. (¶14). Because Corporation Counsel was objecting to S.G.’s petition, the court concluded it would not be able to rule on the petition before losing jurisdiction (S.G.’s 18th birthday) and therefore dismissed the action. (¶14). S.G. appeals.
Before getting into the merits, COA first has to grapple with the mootness doctrine, as S.G. concedes her appeal is now legally moot. (¶20). However, COA holds that two exceptions apply. First, “this issue is of great public importance.” (¶21). Second, “this issue is likely to arise again and should be addressed to resolve uncertainty.” (¶22).
As to the issue of statutory construction, this appeal focuses on the language of a statute providing that “[t]he interests of the public shall be represented in proceedings under this chapter … [b]y the district attorney or, if designated by the county board of supervisors, by the corporation counsel, in any matter arising under [WIS. STAT. §§] 48.13, 48.133, or 48.977 or, if applicable, [§] 48.9795.” (¶27). (alterations in original). Applying a plain language interpretation, COA holds that the statute “is not ambiguous and does not confer party status on a corporation counsel in a CHIPS action arising under § 48.13 when they are not a petitioner.” (¶28).
To reach that conclusion, COA begins by examining closely-related statutes in chapter 48. (¶29). First, the statutes “explicitly authorize individuals other than a corporation counsel to sign and file CHIPS petitions.” (¶30). This suggests “that the legislature did not consider a corporation counsel to be a required petitioner in a CHIPS action.” (Id.). Second, corporation counsel is not listed a required party under the notice statute, § 48.255(4), nor are they required to receive notification from the court under § 48.27(3)(a)1. (¶31). COA concludes that “these statutes indicate that the legislature did not consider the participation of a corporation counsel in the subsequent CHIPS proceedings to be necessary or required.” (Id.).
Putting these statutes together, COA holds: “We see no reason why the legislature would confer party status on a corporation counsel under § 48.09(5) in a CHIPS action arising under § 48.13—and thereby allow a corporation counsel to contest a CHIPS petition—but then expressly exclude the corporation counsel from receiving any notice that the petition was filed or any notice of hearings scheduled on that petition.” (¶32).
Notably, the legislature has made clear in other portions of Chapter 48 when the corporation counsel is a party. For example, the legislature has unambiguously included corporation counsel as a party under two statutes identified by COA, § 48.977 and § 48.9795. (¶¶34-35). “These provisions […] illustrate that the legislature knows how to define a corporation counsel’s role with respect to petitions under Wis. Stat. ch. 48 when the corporation counsel is not a petitioner.” (¶36). “In other words, if the legislature had wanted to confer party status on a corporation counsel under § 48.13 when the corporation counsel is not a petitioner, it could have, and presumably would have, expressly done so by adopting similar language as that incorporated in §§ 48.977 and 48.9795. (Id.).
Finally, COA finds that a contrary interpretation would contravene the “manifest purpose” of Chapter 48, as it “would allow a corporation counsel to contest a CHIPS petition sought by a child, parent, or guardian and potentially prevent the child from receiving the protection or services that a circuit court might correctly determine the child needs.” (¶39).
Accordingly, COA reverses the circuit court’s order conferring party status. (¶40).
