Kenosha County DC&FS v. R.M.F., 2023AP2156-157, 2/21/24, District II (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Given the difficult standard for proving judicial bias, COA concludes that R.M.F. has failed to show that the court’s remarks to jurors are a basis for reversing this TPR.
“Richard” exercised his right to a jury trial in this TPR action. (¶4). Richard’s appeal focuses on the court’s prefatory remarks to the jurors, where it discussed the procedure and allegations at length. (¶¶5-7). Richard claims that this lengthy speech by the circuit court (13 transcript pages) “smacked” of bias, as he believes it signalled to the jury that the court had “adopted” the allegations in the petition and was “advocating” for the State’s position. (¶8). After summarizing the case law–which constructs an imposing set of obstacles for COA to conclude that a judge was biased–COA holds that “Richard’s arguments fall short of showing that the trial court’s introductory remarks gave rise to a serious risk of actual bias.” (¶11). The circuit court made clear that these were “allegations” and also properly communicated the burden of proof. (¶11). Moreover, the jury was also properly instructed to disregard entirely any “impression” they might have formed about the judge’s view of the case. (¶14).
In addition to claiming judicial bias, Richard also argues that the court’s introductory remarks “improperly injected the best interest of the child standard into” the grounds phase. (¶16). Richard focuses on a comment made by the court that the proceedings had been commenced “in the best interest” of the children. (Id.). Once again, COA is unpersuaded that any error occurred, especially in light of the instructions which properly stated that the “best interest” was not a consideration for the jury. (¶18).
