Glossip v. Oklahoma, USSC No. 22-7466, 2/25/2025; Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)
In a 5-3 defense win, the legal system finally yields to the prosecutor’s concession that Glossip is entitled to a new trial.
Glossip was charged with capital murder in Oklahoma, under the theory that he had recruited another man, Sneed, to commit a financially-motivated homicide. (p.4). Sneed was the prosecution’s star witness at trial. (Id.). After being convicted and sentenced to death, Glossip was granted a new trial by the state appellate court given his lawyer’s failure to effectively cross-examine Sneed, whose testimony was largely uncorroborated, about a number of inconsistent statements. (Id.). The second trial was another messy affair which almost resulted in a mistrial. (p.5). The State argued that Glossip was the mastermind behind the murder and that Sneed, the man who beat and stabbed the victim, was a “puppy” under his command. (p.6).
Following Glossip’s conviction, his continual litigation of the case eventually caught the eye of the state legislature, which retained a law firm to conduct an independent inquiry into the integrity of Glossip’s conviction. (p.7). That report uncovered a number of troubling revelations, including the prosecution’s destruction of evidence, an intentionally false portrayal of Sneed as meek and nonviolent, and reliance on the testimony of a cop later jailed for making false statements. (Id.).
In apparent response to the report, the State turned over seven boxes of previously withheld evidence, including documents suggesting Sneed’s desire to recant his story inculpating Glossip. (p.8). However, the state court then denied Glossip’s motion for a new trial based on these revelations. (p.9).
Thereafter, the State “unearthed” an eighth box of withheld material. (Id.). As the State later conceded, this evidence established that Sneed was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, had been prescribed lithium to treat that condition, and that the State intentionally elicited false testimony from Sneed on the topic of his mental health during Glossip’s trial. (p.10). As a result, the State retained independent counsel to conduct another review of Glossip’s conviction and that investigation concluded there had been a number of legal errors which undermined the integrity of Glossip’s conviction. (Id.). Glossip filed another petition for a new trial, which the State joined. (p.11). However, the petition for post-conviction relief was again denied by the state appellate court. (p.12).
SCOTUS reverses for a new trial. On the merits, it concludes “that the prosecution
violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony.” (p.16). In SCOTUS’s view, this case presents a straightforward violation of the rule articulated in Napue v. Illinois, which “held that a conviction knowingly ‘obtained through use of false evidence’ violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” (p.17). To establish such a violation, the defendant needs to show two things. First, that “the prosecution knowingly solicited false testimony or knowingly allowed it ‘to go uncorrected when it appear[ed].'” (Id.). Second, that “the false testimony “may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial[.]” (Id.). Notably, “this materiality standard requires the beneficiary of the constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Id.).
Here, the facts of the case show that the State correctly conceded error, as Sneed clearly testified falsely about his mental health during the trial and the State not only had access to records disproving that testimony but also discussed the matter with Sneed prior to his testimony. (p.18).
As to materiality, this evidence would have undermined Sneed’s credibility in a case where his credibility was key to Glossip being convicted. (p.19). Moreover, evidence that Sneed had a mental health disorder which, in conjunction with his drug usage, could have caused him to act in an impulsive and violent fashion, would have undermined the State’s theory that he was a nonviolent “puppy” acting at Glossip’s direction. (p.20). Notably, SCOTUS holds that its materiality analysis properly considers the broad panoply of error presented by this case, as the “prejudice analysis requires a ‘cumulative evaluation’ of all the evidence, whether or not that evidence is before the Court in the form of an independent claim for relief.” (p.22).
SCOTUS also rejects that portion of the state court’s decision which rested on a finding that the defense “was aware or should have been aware” that this testimony was false. (p.23). The duty to correct false testimony rests with the State, however. (Id.). Likewise, speculation about why Sneed testified falsely is irrelevant. (Id.).
This is a nice case demonstrating the strength of a Napue claim. We’ve omitted a large portion of the discussion involving procedural matters to focus on that substantive holding. For those readers interested in the jurisdiction question–or in a discussion of whether a remand for a new trial is the appropriate remedy here–we encourage them to check out the detailed discussion appearing in the text of the opinion.
