In addition to the SCOTUS cases to which we devoted individual posts (Smith v. Arizona, Erlinger v. U.S., U.S. v. Rahimi, Garland v. Cargill), below is a summary of criminal or criminal-adjacent cases decided by SCOTUS in the 2023-24 term that we consider of interest to criminal practice in Wisconsin state courts.
City of Grants Pass v. Johnson; USSC No. 23-175; 6/28/24
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not prohibit laws against camping in public spaces.
In a 6-3 decision, SCOTUS rejected Johnson’s argument (acting on behalf of homeless people living in Grants Pass, Oregon), and the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, that the Eighth Amendment can invalidate a law based on the conduct that is proscribed: “The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause focuses on the question what method or kind of punishment a government may impose after a criminal conviction, not on the question whether a government may criminalize particular behavior in the first place or how it may go about securing a conviction for that offense.” (16).
The Court declined to extend Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), which held that a California statute providing that no person shall be addicted to the use of narcotics, was cruel and unusual punishment because it punished a person’s status. The majority considered Robinson an outlier because it “sits uneasily with the [Eighth] Amendment’s terms, original meaning, and our precedents. Its holding is restricted to laws that criminalize ‘mere status.’ Nothing in the decision called into question the ‘broad power of States to regulate acts undertaken with some mens rea.” (23). Because the ordinances at issue in Grants Pass forbid “actions like ‘occupying a campsite’ on public property ‘for the purpose of maintaining a temporary place to live,’” the laws do not criminalize mere status. (20).
Diaz v. United States; USSC No. 23-14; 6/20/24
Expert’s opinion regarding general practices of drug traffickers did not violate rule of evidence prohibiting expert opinion testimony about the defendant’s mental state that is an element of the offense.
At her trial for transporting methamphetamine, Diaz’s defense was that she did not know there were drugs in her car. A Homeland Security agent testified as an expert regarding the common practices of Mexican drug-trafficking organizations, including that drug traffickers do not generally entrust large quantities of drugs to people who are unaware they are transporting them. Diaz argued that the agent’s testimony violated Fed. R. Evid. 704(b), which provides that in a criminal case, an expert witness may not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.
SCOTUS, in a 6-3 decision, held that the agent’s testimony did not violate Rule 704(b) because the rule “applies only to opinions about the defendant. Because [the agent] did not express an opinion about whether Diaz herself knowingly transported methamphetamine, his testimony did not violate Rule 704(b).” (7).
Wisconsin’s Rules of Evidence are not analogous to the Federal Rules on this issue. In Wisconsin, an opinion or inference that is otherwise admissible “is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” Wis. Stat. § 907.04. However, the “ultimate issue” may not “be one that is a legal concept for which the jury needs definitional instructions.” State v. Rocha-Mayo, 2014 WI 57, ¶ 27.
Fischer v. United States; USSC No. 23-5572; 6/28/24
To prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) (to otherwise obstruct, influence, or impede any official proceeding), the government must prove that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding.
This case concerned one of the defendants charged with participating in the January 6, 2021, riot at the U.S. Capitol, who was charged with corruptly obstructing an official proceeding under § 1512(c)(2). At issue was whether § 1512(c)(2) applies only to acts that affect the integrity or availability of evidence – which is the focus of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1); or whether all forms of obstructive conduct are encompassed by the “otherwise obstructs” language in § 1512(c)(2). Fischer was charged with trespassing into the Capitol and assaulting officers, but the complaint did not allege that he obstructed or impeded any documents.
The Court held, in a 6-3 decision, that the “otherwise” provision of § 1512(c)(2) is “limited by the preceding list of criminal violations” contained in § 1512(c)(1), which refer only to altering or destroying records and documents used in an official proceeding. (7).
Although the specific holding is not relevant to state court matters, the Court clarifies the following general principles of statutory interpretation: 1) “otherwise” provisions should not untethered from the rest of a criminal statute; 2) a word is given more precise content by “the neighboring words with which it is associated”; 3) a general term at the end of a list of specific items is controlled and defined by the specific terms that precede it; and 4) a legislature will not ordinarily introduce a general term that renders meaningless the specific text that accompanies it. (5-7).
McElrath v. Georgia; USSC No. 22-721; 2/21/24
A jury’s verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes.
At his trial for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault, the jury found McElrath not guilty by reason of insanity on the malice murder charge; while guilty but mentally ill on the felony murder and aggravated assault charges. McElrath appealed in the Georgia state courts and argued that the jury’s verdict for felony murder was “repugnant” to the verdict for malice murder (under Georgia’s repugnancy doctrine, a court may set aside a verdict where there are findings by the jury that are not legally and logically possible of existing simultaneously). The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed the verdicts were repugnant, but vacated both the malice-murder and felony-murder verdicts.
SCOTUS reversed in a unanimous decision and held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits second-guessing the reason for a jury’s acquittal. (94). And for “double jeopardy purposes, a jury’s determination that a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity is a conclusion that criminal culpability had not been established, just as much as any other form of acquittal.” (95).
Snyder v. United States; USSC No. 23-108; 6/26/24
Federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B)) prohibiting state and local officials from “corruptly” soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept anything of value from any person, intended to be influenced or rewarded for an official act, does not apply to gratuities.
The Court, in a 6-3 decision, distinguished between bribes – payments made or agreed to before an official act in order to influence the official with respect to that future act; and gratuities – payments made to an official after an official act as a token of appreciation. (2). Because the federal statute prohibiting state and local officials from corruptly accepting anything of value more closely resembled the federal statute prohibiting federal officials from accepting bribes, rather than gratuities, the Court held that § 666(a)(1)(B) only applied to state and local officials who accept bribes. (7-11).
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence provides the high court’s imprimatur to any of our readers arguing for the rule of lenity: “[A]ny fair reader of this statute would be left with a reasonable doubt whether it covers the defendant’s charged conduct. And when that happens, judges are bound by the ancient rule of lenity to decide the case as the Court does today, not for the prosecutor but for the presumptively free individual.” (1).
