April was a busy month; we’ve tried to pull out those cases most relevant to our readers:
- Daniel Madero v. Owen McGuinness, No. 23-2574: This case arises from a lawsuit alleging a false arrest. After a hit-and-run accident, the victim and several witnesses tried to play vigilante and track down the culprit. They violently confronted Madero, who was in the wrong place at the wrong time. When Officer McGuinness showed up, he accepted the statements of the three witnesses over Madero’s denials. In this context, the Court holds that there was PC to arrest, as McGuinness was faced with a “three against one” scenario. And, while a crash investigation could have–and eventually did–reveal Madero’s innocence, McGuinness was not required to conduct that investigation before arresting Madero under these facts.
- United States of America v. Jay A. Liestman, No. 21-3225: This is a lengthy en banc opinion which goes deep on the mechanics of determining when a state conviction triggers a federal sentencing enhancement. We bring it to our readers’ attention, however, because it deals directly with an issue of Wisconsin law–whether a prior conviction for possession of child pornography under § 948.12(1m) triggers the sentencing enhancement in federal court under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(1)(b) for repeat sex offenders. The question is complicated, somewhat, because Wisconsin’s statute contains some notable differences from its federal analogue in that it (1) also prohibits “accessing” CP and (2) criminalizes a broader spectrum of offensive material, meaning that “a defendant can be convicted in Wisconsin for possessing material that would not support a federal prosecution.” Despite these differences, a majority of the court holds that a conviction under Wisconsin’s statute triggers the federal enhancer.
- United States of America v. Christopher Allen Yates & Shawn Thomas Connelly, Nos. 22-2994 & 23-1461: We waffled on including this case, but thought litigators may have been intrigued by this federal win which results in resentencing with respect to Yates. Simplifying greatly, drug purity is an issue that must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence in order to determine the appropriate Guidelines penalty. This case is interesting because the government is effectively called out for having used an unrepresentative sample size in ascertaining the purity level at issue in this case. Litigators dealing with similar arguments in state sentencings therefore may find some support for poking at least some holes.
- United States of America v. Anthony Gay, No. 23-2097: This is a very Easterbrook-ian opinion which quickly dispatches a handful of evidentiary claims. The case is notable, however, because it represents a failed Bruen challenge–indeed, a case where the challenge in question barely gets off the ground. The Court falls back on Heller’s assurances that SCOTUS’s new gun rights jurisprudence was not meant to cast doubt on the disarmament of felons. And, while the Court reluctantly acknowledges there may be “some room for as-applied challenges,” it holds that only “law-abiding, responsible citizens” are entitled to mount such a challenge; Gay’s criminal history and conduct in this case prevents him from claiming that title.
- Jacob D. Lickers v. United States of America, No. 22-1179: This is a ¶ 2255 challenge to a federal conviction, where Lickers alleges ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Lickers was originally charged in state court with child pornography offenses. His lawyer, however, successfully litigated a suppression motion which resulted in dismissal. Thereafter, the case was referred to the feds. An FBI agent submitted a warrant to re-examine Lickers’s devices. Although the affidavit disclosed that those devices had already been examined and found to contain CP, it neglected to mention “that the State court had suppressed that evidence based on a finding that Lickers’s arrest was unconstitutional.” Although the Seventh Circuit, on direct appeal, held that the warrant was unsupported by PC, it held that the “good faith exception” saved the day. Lickers now argues that his trial attorney was ineffective for not pursuing a Franks/Mann motion or asking different questions at a suppression hearing. While the Court is clearly troubled by the conduct of law enforcement in this case, and suggests that reasonably competent counsel should have been too, this IAC case falters for the usual, fact-dependent, reasons having to do with deference and standard of review.
- Tabatha Washington and Donte Howard v. City of Chicago, No. 22-2467: Want to know how hard it is to win a § 1983 claim alleging that LEO “deliberately misled” system actors to secure a determination of PC? Here, the Court accepts, for the purposes of this dispute, that while there were four distinct instances of dishonesty, those misrepresentations/omissions were not necessary to the determination of PC so these defendants–now acquitted of the homicide for which they were arrested–are out of luck.
- Estate of Gavin Wallmow v. Oneida County, No. 23-2141: It is also extraordinarily difficult, it turns out, to prevail on a claim that a person’s jailers are responsible for that individual’s tragic suicide while in their care. While the Court calls this a tragedy, it holds that the case law does not render the law enforcement officers at issue responsible.
- Celina Montoya et al. v. Rob Jeffreys, No. 22-2791: Mostly, this is a case without much local interest, as it concerns a challenge to an Illinois policy restricting contact between a “parent convicted of a sex offense and her minor child while the parent is on mandatory supervised release.” However, we thought our readers might be interested to hear that a policy prohibiting phone contact is unconstitutional.
- United States of America v. David Perez, No. 22-3282: Holding that a probation agent, who was permitted to narrate while a video was played at a “supervised release revocation hearing” held before a district court judge, was actually an adverse witness and that Perez’s constitutional rights required him to be given the opportunity to cross-examine this “narrator.” The error, however, is harmless.
- United States of America v. Dylan Ostrum, No. 23-1364: Ostrum challenges the search of a Chrysler and a safe inside that car. The wrinkle is that while the Chrysler was stolen, Ostrum denies knowing it was hot. “This raises the question: does the unwitting driver of a stolen vehicle stand in the same position as a car thief?” The Court punts on this standing question, however, as it remains Ostrum’s burden of proving a legitimate expectation of privacy and he has not done so here. And, while a person lawfully present in a vehicle might be able to assert a privacy interest in a container inside a car, “a person wrongfully present in a stolen vehicle is differently situated.” Thus, Ostrum has no standing to challenge the search of the safe, either. However, even if he did it would not matter, as the automobile exception neatly permits the search(es) at issue.
- United States of America v. Robert Sylvester Kelly, No. 23-1449: Kelly loses out on his attempt to challenge this prosecution on statute of limitations grounds, as “it is not unconstitutional to apply a newer statute of limitations to old conduct when the defendant was subject to prosecution at the time of the change, as Kelly was in 2003.” And, while he also argues that the different victims should have resulted in different trials, the Court sees no error in the district court’s decision to conduct a singular trial involving three distinct victims.
- Alan Kustok v. David Mitchell, No. 23-2125: And we will end with a meaty habeas case for those readers who have made it this far. Long story short: Habeas is hard, and the complicated cluster of procedural rules don’t make it any easier. Even though Kustok presents new forensic evidence tending to undermine aspects of the State’s case, some complicated case law on procedural default means he is unable to move forward with that claim in federal court. And, given the other evidence against him, the Court holds he has not shown “actual prejudice from procedurally defaulting his claim.”
