July brought another bevy of interesting cases. As usual, we’ve tried to select those most relevant to our audience:
United States of America v. Zebulon Xavier Marzette, No. 23-1646: Marzette tries to attack his conviction for possession of a firearm as a felon by challenging the DNA evidence which allegedly showed he had touched that firearm. He raises a preserved challenge to the chain-of-custody evidence. However, the Seventh reiterates that chain-of-custody is a very low bar to clear and the State’s detailed evidence satisfied here.
United States of America v. Millard Williams, No. 23-3179: Williams was prosecuted for mailing a controlled substance. On appeal, the Seventh rejects his argument that police lacked reasonable suspicion to seize the package in question. Here, police listened in on a “suspicious” call involving Williams that appeared to reference the shipment of drugs in coded language. These facts “also fit to a tee the profile of Williams’s extensive prior criminal activity.” Thus, given Williams’s prior convictions establishing a modus operandi of transmitting drugs through the mail, the Court holds that “This kind of criminal history can support reasonable suspicion–especially when, as here, it is a near perfect match to the suspicious conduct in question.” Moreover, law enforcement had sufficient information at hand derived from the phone call supporting reasonable suspicion to seize this particular package.
United States of America v. Kentrevion Watkins, et al, Nos. 20-2048 and etc: This is a good read for practitioners interested in litigating Batson challenges. Here, the defendants appeal the district court’s denial of the Batson motion by arguing that the court conducted that inquiry using an improper legal standard. In doing so, they escape the usually deferential nature of review as whether the court used the right legal analysis is a question of law reviewed de novo. Here, the Court discerns two problems with that analysis. First, the district court is faulted for its finding that the defendants failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination under Step 1 of the Batson inquiry. The Seventh reminds the reader that the defendant’s burden at this first stage is “light” and there is no requirement that the defendant “prove” discrimination by satisfying any formal burden; instead, the defendant must simply indicate “circumstances raising a suspicion that discrimination occurred.” It is also not necessary to point to a “pattern” of discrimination on the first step; rather, an allegation that a single strike has been used improperly is sufficient. The Court holds that the defendants satisfied their burden here.
Second, the Court also faults the district court’s credibility findings in response to the State’s proffering of an ostensibly race-neutral justification. A mere affirmation that the reasons are race-neutral, without more, does not suffice; instead, the court must make sufficient findings enabling judicial review of its credibility finding. Accordingly, the case is remanded for a retrospective Batson hearing.
Anthony D. Lee, Sr. v. Darren Galloway, Warden, No. 23-1552: This is a tough case that shows how even the best-pleaded postconviction claims are capable of falling apart at an evidentiary hearing. Lee has been fighting this case on federal habeas since 2017. Central to his claim of ineffectiveness, he has produced six affidavits from witnesses that he claims his lawyer “ignored.” In 2018, the Seventh Circuit took the unusual step of remanding this case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. To say that things did not go Lee’s way is an understatement. At least one of the proposed witnesses denied writing the affidavit attributed to him and another did not remember signing the one bearing her signature. There was no trial file and trial counsel’s recollections were “hazy.” Accordingly, the district court found the record to be “too thin and inconclusive” to merit any kind of relief. The Seventh ultimately affirms on prejudice grounds, holding that “[t]he record before us provides little indication that testimony from some or all of the affiant-witnesses would have had a meaningful impact on Lee’s case, much less undermine our confidence in the verdict.”
United States of America v. Refugio Avila, No. 22-3231: This factually-dense case arises from what appears to have been a clearly pretextual traffic stop conducted in context of an investigation into gang activity. During the stop, Avila was frisked multiple times, resulting in the discovery of an illegal firearm. Although the Seventh Circuit is “skeptical about the officers’ explanation that they came to follow Avila by accident[,]” it holds that his suppression challenges all fail, as they are inextricably bound up with deferentially-reviewed credibility determinations from the district court. Thus, even though Avila tries to claim that the officers were wholly incredible, the Court holds that the district court was not wedded to an “all-or-nothing” assessment of their credibility and fairly relied on the officers’ testimony about two alleged traffic infractions in order to find reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.
And, while one of the officers admitted under oath that he extended the stop “to keep looking for other misconduct that was not related to the traffic violation,” the Seventh holds that it is not bound by the officer’s subjective intent. Here, the stop was not unduly prolonged under an objective standard as police continually executed the “mission” of the traffic stop during the six-minute encounter leading to discovery of the weapon. Moreover, the repeated pat downs were justified by officer safety concerns and objective facts like Avila’s membership in a gang and his posture and body language during the encounter.
Terrell Esco v. City of Chicago, et al, No. 23-1304: This § 1983 challenge comes down to whether police had probable cause to detain Esco. While investigating the brandishing of a firearm observed on surveillance video, police encountered a group of individuals in the middle of the street. Someone threw a gun under a car and Esco, one of the persons in the group, ran. Police appeared to believe that Esco was the person who had tossed the gun. Although that belief was eventually disproven and the charges later dismissed, the Seventh concludes that body camera footage nevertheless “supports a finding that the officers had probable cause to believe that Esco was the person who possessed a gun and then discarded the weapon.”
Cassandra Socha v. City of Joliet, Illinois and Edward Grizzle, No. 23-2905: We highlight this case because of the Court’s cautionary comments regarding warrants permitting extraction of data from a cell phone. Here, Socha–an officer with the Joliet PD–was in a relationship with another officer, Crowley. Following a domestic dispute at their home, Crowley was criminally prosecuted. During the trial, Socha texted a State’s witness a message “taking issue with her testimony.” When authorities learned of the text, they investigated it as potential witness harassment and sought a search warrant for the contents of Socha’s phone. They then extracted all the data from that phone and other officers then looked at nude images of Socha contained within the phone dump.
Socha argues that the officer who sought the warrant made false statements or withheld information from the warrant affidavit by exaggerating the need for a complete phone dump, a claim that goes nowhere on appeal given defense-unfriendly precedent. But the Seventh has some sympathy for her underlying concern as to the breadth of the warrant, given that police were really seeking only one incriminatory text message and surely did not need to investigate the entire contents of Socha’s digital life. The Court therefore suggests that the requirements of particularity for warrants are especially important in such cases and reminds “police of their obligation to be specific and explain why there is probable cause to search every part of a cell phone they seek to search.” Under these circumstances, where police sought only a single text, it implies that the warrant may have been overbroad. Yet, any such overbreadth is not dispositive given our old friend, good faith.
United States of America v. Robert Smith, No. 23-2472: The district court did not err in denying the defendant’s request for new counsel. Although Smith explained his dissatisfaction on the record, the request was untimely, the district court conducted a proper inquiry into his concerns, and the record supports the court’s finding that the relationship “had not deteriorated to the point where a total lack of communication prevented an adequate defense.”
United States of America v. Alexander Kawleski, No. 21-1279: The Seventh upholds the district court’s denial of Kawleski’s motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The evidence in question was of dubious admissibility under the evidence code, related only to impeachment of a State’s witness, and did not establish the probability of a different result.
Robert W. Dekelaita v. United States of America, No. 22-2911: This is a factually-dense case involving the prosecution of an immigration attorney for immigration fraud. The defendant argues, in essence, that the State failed to disclose the existence of benefits given to witnesses (his former clients). Even if there was some assistance given to these individuals in their immigration cases, the Court ultimately holds there was no “materiality” and therefore affirms. The inside mechanics of the case don’t merit more of a recap than that, but this case has a good discussion of the components for pleading a Brady claim involving benefits to witnesses.
Donnell D. Wilson v. Ron Neal, No. 23-2316: This is a convoluted habeas case that is dense on procedure and largely relevant only to habeas nerds. Yet, we thought we would bring its somewhat depressing substantive holding to our readers’ attention: It is not clearly established law, for the purposes of AEDPA, that “de facto” life sentences are forbidden under Miller v. Alabama.
Michelle R. Gilbank v. Wood County Department of Human Services, et al, No. 22-1037: There really isn’t a lot for us to say about this case, as it involves the convoluted mechanics of the Rooker-Feldman (anyone else want to have law school flashbacks?) doctrine and ultimately does not result in relief for this parent alleging that Wood County authorities acted unlawfully in depriving her of custody of her child in connection with this CHIPS case, which was ultimately closed. However, we thought we would include it here, as it might be of local interest to our Wood County readers.
