State v. Isaac Hughes, Sr., 2011 WI App 87 (recommended for publication); for Hughes: Benbow P. Cheesman, Jr.; case activity
Conviction for escape, § 946.42(3), may be sustained even if the jury never actually saw the judgment of conviction that landed the defendant in custody.
¶12 We agree with the trial court that, when considered in light of all the other evidence adduced at trial, McPike’s testimony sufficiently allowed the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Hughes was serving a sentence for a crime that he was convicted of when he left Chaney without permission. McPike testified that Hughes was an “inmate” at Chaney, a minimum security prison. She also testified that on May 13, 2008, her control sergeant and floor sergeant advised her that Hughes had escaped from the temporary lockup. McPike further testified that after Hughes escaped, she ordered an escape packet, which contained Hughes’s judgment of conviction, and Knaack testified that she never told Hughes that his sentence was over. Viewing this testimony in the light most favorable to the verdict, as we are required to do, see Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 506-07, we hold that the knowledge that Hughes was an inmate at a prison whose sentence had not yet expired and that McPike had received a judgment of conviction pertaining to him was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the reason Hughes was at Chaney was because he was serving a sentence, regardless of whether the jury actually saw the judgment of conviction.
Moreover the State need not “prove exactly which crime the defendant was sentenced for,” ¶¶1, 13.
