Daniel Doubek v. Joshua Kaul, 2020AP704, 3/31/21, District 2, certification granted 6/16/21; decision issued, circuit court reversed, 2022 WI 31; case activity (including briefs)
Issue:
Are Evans v. DOJ, 2014 WI App 31, 353 Wis. 2d 289, 844 N.W.2d 403, and Leonard v. State, 2015 WI App 57, 364 Wis. 2d 491, 868 N.W.2d 186, “good law” in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014)?
Village of Greendale v. Matthew R. Derzay, 2019AP2294, District 1, 3/30/31 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The burden of proof for a petitioner under § 968.20 is preponderance of the evidence, but the circuit court applied the clear and convincing standard and demanded Derzay provide certain kinds of proof to meet that burden. This was error. [continue reading…]
Jackson County DHS v. M.M.B., 2021AP98 & 2021AP99, District 4, 4/1/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
M.M.B. stipulated that there were grounds for terminating her parental rights to her two children, but argued at the disposition phase that termination wasn’t in the best interest of the children. At that hearing, the County presented the testimony of a psychologist who had assessed M.M.B.’s “psychosocial functioning, including issues related to parenting and substance abuse.” M.M.B. objected, arguing the psychologist’s evaluation was not contemporaneous to the dispositional hearing, but had been conducted two years earlier, and thus wasn’t relevant to the issue of the children’s best interests. (¶¶3-6). The circuit court didn’t err in admitting this testimony. [continue reading…]
Winnebago County v. A.A.L., 2020AP1511, 3/24/2021, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
A.A.L. appeals her commitment under ch. 51. She claims the county didn’t give her adequate notice of which statutory forms of dangerousness it intended to prove, and that in any event it didn’t prove any of them. The court of appeals finds the notice argument forfeited (though it goes on to say it’s also unconvincing). And though it admonishes the county for presenting a bare-bones case and calls the question “close,” the court also holds the evidence of dangerousness sufficient for commitment. [continue reading…]
Fond du Lac County v. J.L.H., 2020AP2049, 3/24/21, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)e. lays out the “fifth standard” for dangerousness; a person can be committed under it if his or her mental illness prevents him or her from understanding the advantages and disadvantages of treatment, and a lack of treatment will cause a substantial probability that the person will be harmed and become unable to function. But there’s a limitation on this standard that the other standards lack: a person can’t be dangerous under it if care is available, either in the community at large or through ch. 55, that diminishes the threat of harm so that it is not substantial. [continue reading…]
State v. A.M.-C., 2021AP94 & 2021AP95, 3/30/21, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The state petitioned to terminate A.M.-C.’s rights to two of her children on failure-to-assume and continuing-CHIPS grounds. After being told (apparently via interpreter, as Spanish is her first language) that she had to attend all hearings, A.M.-C. moved to New York City. The circuit court rejected her request to attend by telephone, found her in default, and after prove-up, found her unfit. It later found termination of her rights to be in the children’s best interest. [continue reading…]
Torres v. Madrid, USSC No. 19-292, 2021 WL 1132514, 3/25/21, reversing 769 Fed. Appx. 654 (10th Cir. 2019); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Fans of dueling citations to ancient cases will want to savor the entirety of the majority and the somewhat heated dissent in this case; the serjeants-at-mace shew their mace at one point. Everybody else just needs to know this: a police officer who applies physical force to the body of a person seizes that person if the objective circumstances show an intent to restrain. This seizure occurs during the application of that force even if the intended restraint doesn’t succeed; that is, if the person gets away. And that force can be communicated by means of a projectile, like a bullet. [continue reading…]
State v. Mark D. Jensen, 2021 WI 27, 3/18/21, affirming a court of appeals summary disposition; case activity (including some briefs)
Julie Jensen died by poisoning in 1998. The state eventually charged her husband, Mark, with having killed her; the defense was that she had died by suicide. Before her death Julie had made oral and written statements to the effect that Mark would be responsible if something happened to her. She wasn’t available to testify at the trial, of course, and Mark moved to exclude these statements on Confrontation grounds. Our supreme court now holds that, when it held these statements testimonial in a prior appeal (in 2007), it established the law of the case; it further concludes that SCOTUS has not altered the law so much since then that the law-of-the-case doctrine should give way. So, it remands for a new trial, without the statements. [continue reading…]
