Daniel Doubek v. Joshua Kaul, 2020AP704, certification granted June 16, 2021; case activity (including briefs)
Issue (from Court of Appeals’ Certification):
Are Evans v. DOJ, 2014 WI App 31, 353 Wis. 2d 289, 844 N.W.2d 403, and Leonard v. State, 2015 WI App 57, 364 Wis. 2d 491, 868 N.W.2d 186, “good law” in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014)?
For complete information, see our post on the court of appeals’ certification.
On August 25, 2021, the court of appeals ordered publication of the following criminal law related decisions:
State v. Oscar C. Thomas, 2021 WI App 55 (rejecting challenges to conviction based on Confrontation Clause violation, corroboration of confession issue, and biased juror claim).
State v. Avery B. Thomas, 2021 WI App 59 (defendant entitled to credit for time in custody on federal supervision hold due to Wisconsin criminal case conduct).
State v. Joel R. Davis, 2021 WI App 65; case activity (including briefs)
A police officer stopped Davis’s car in the early evening. He initially said it was because Davis lacked a passenger-side mirror. But it turns out that’s not illegal. Wis. Stat. § 347.40. So the next day–and despite having failed to mention it to the other officers at the stop, which was video recorded–he “updated” his report to say that actually, he’d stopped Davis for a seatbelt violation. But the body-cam video shows that Davis’s seatbelt was fastened when the officer initially approached the car. [continue reading…]
State v. John William Lane, 2021AP327, 8/19/21, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An officer saw Lane departing a bar around 2:10 in the morning. He followed him in his squad car and eventually pulled him over, and eventually arrested him for OWI. The tailing and the stop were recorded on the squad car’s camera. The circuit court concluded the officer’s observations didn’t create reasonable suspicion for the stop, and the court of appeals now affirms. [continue reading…]
Turns out ShotSpotter maybe ain’t all it’s cracked up to be, according to this article. (There’s a case pending in the state supreme court involving an investigatory stop based in part on a ShotSpotter alert; see here.)
On the other hand, those small nifty cameras everywhere—on cell phones, doorbells, on police officers themselves—are putting paid to the notion that police never lie, and at least some of the falsely accused are better off for it. For instances, see here.
State v. Caleb James Watson, 2021AP355-CR, District 2, 8/25/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Taking Watson to a local police station to perform field sobriety tests (FSTs) wasn’t unreasonable and thus didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment. [continue reading…]
State v. Derek V. Schroth, 2021AP733, District 2, 8/25/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Schroth challenges the probable cause to arrest him for OWI and the finding that he refused a blood draw. There were ample facts for probable cause. (¶¶3-8, 13-15). And though the arresting officer couldn’t recall whether Schroth said “no” or “something else” when asked to submit to a blood draw, the officer did testify that Schroth refused. The circuit court credited the officer’s testimony that he remembered the refusal, and that is sufficient to support its ruling that Schroth refused. (¶¶16-18).
State v. Jeremy J. Deen, 2020AP1399, 8/24/21, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Police received a tip that an IP address associated with Deen’s home had uploaded child pornography. They went to the home and Deen let them in. While inside, officers noted Deen was carrying a knife, so they frisked him, which turned up a cell phone. In response to officers’ questions about child porn, Deen made some equivocal statements about whether there might be any on the phone, and the officers took it. The court of appeals holds that the possibility that Deen would hide or destroy the phone or delete the images it might contain supplied sufficient exigent circumstances that the police could seize it without a warrant. [continue reading…]
