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State v. Tavodess Matthews, 2020 WI App 33; case activity (including briefs).

Section 801.58(1) states that if a party to a civil action files a judicial substitution request “preceding the hearing of any preliminary contested matter” and not later than 60 days after service of the summons and complaint then the request must be granted.  A “preliminary contested matter” refers to a “substantive issue” going to”the merits of the case.” The court of appeals holds that a motion to adjourn a probable cause hearing  in a Chapter 980 case fits that bill. [continue reading…]

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This report contextualizes discussions about early release in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. It begins by outlining the actions taken in Wisconsin thus far to address the spread of the disease into and within state facilities. It then describes the authorities and duties of the governor, DOC, and individual facilities with respect to releasing prisoners to relieve overcrowding, respond to specific threats, or address the health and safety of individual inmates.

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State v. Gary R. Schumacher, 2019AP1261-CR, District 4, 5/7/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Schumacher was convicted of OWI with a prohibited alcohol content in connection with an accident at 8:45 p.m. His blood was drawn at 10:56 p.m., and tests showed a BAC of .171, well above his legal limit of 0.08. The sole issue on appeal was whether Schumacher’s trial counsel had adequately cross-examined Kristin Drewieck, a chemist with the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene about her estimates of Schumacher’s BAC at 8:45 p.m. [continue reading…]

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United States v. Sineneng-Smith, USSC No. 19-67, 2020 WL 2200834, May 7, 2020, vacating and remanding 910 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2019); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reformulated the issues Sineneng-Smith raised in district court and on an appeal of her conviction for violating a federal immigration statute, and invited three organizations to file amicus briefs and participate in further oral argument. (Slip op. at 5-7). The Supreme Court holds the Court of Appeals “departed so drastically from the principle of party presentation as to consitute an abuse of discretion.” (Id. at 3). [continue reading…]

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Town of Waterford v. Christopher Pye, 2019AP737, 5/6/20, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals rejects the municipality’s argument that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to the two-year statute of limitation for bringing a forfeiture action. [continue reading…]

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State v. David William Krumm, 2019AP243-CR, District 3, 5/5/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Under § 343.303 and County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999), there was probable cause to believe Krumm was operating while intoxicated, so police could request he submit to a preliminary breath test. [continue reading…]

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Ladarius Marshall v. Scott Eckstein, No. 15-CV-008 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 22, 2020)

Marshall pleaded to homicide and other charges. Before he did so, though, he moved to suppress statements he’d made during more than 12 hours of interrogation at the police station (he was 16 years old at the time). The trial court and our court of appeals held that the interrogating officers “scrupulously honored” Marshall’s multiple assertions that he didn’t want to talk with them anymore. The federal district court finds this conclusion unreasonable because the officers deflected his refusals to talk and cajoled him into continuing. What’s more, the court says that even his later statements–given to officers who did follow Miranda‘s rules–must be suppressed because they were too closely connected to his original, unlawfully-taken statements. [continue reading…]

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State v. Ronald Eugene Provost, 2020 WI App 21; case activity (including briefs)

It’s unclear why this opinion is recommended for publication. Best guess is that is provides a (rather thin) gloss on the “systemic breakdown” exception to the rule that delays attributable to defense counsel don’t weigh in favor of a speedy trial violation. The court cites and adopts a statement from a New Mexico court that defense counsel’s delays represent a “systemic breakdown” only when they are caused by “problems that are both institutional in origin and debilitating in scope.” (¶40). Sounds like a slightly longer way of saying “systemic breakdown,” no? [continue reading…]

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