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State v. D.L., 2019AP2331, District 1, 3/10/20; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The State petitioned to terminate D.L.’s parental rights to Y.P.-T.  for failure to assume parental responsibility in January 2017 and lost at a jury trial. So when the State filed a new T.P.R. proceeding in October 2018, D.L. moved the circuit court to instruct the jury instructed that he had a substantial relationship with Y.P-T for the first 20 months of her life. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. [continue reading…]

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Holguin-Hernadez v. United States, USSC 18-7739, vacating and remanding a per curiam 5th Circuit Court of Appeals opinion;  SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary).

At Holguin-Hernandez’s revocation hearing, his counsel argued for a specific sentence–either nothing or less than 12 months. The government pushed for 12-18 months. After the district court chose 12 months, H-H appealed and argued that the length of his sentence was unreasonable. The government claimed he forfeited that argument by not stating an objection at the end of his sentencing.  Siding with the defendant, SCOTUS held that H-H clearly argued for a sentence shorter than the one the court imposed. “Nothing more is needed to preserve the claim that a longer sentence is unreasonable.” Opinion at 4.  Read the SCOTUSblog analysis here.  If this sounds familiar, it is because SCOW decided a similar issues last month in State v. Counihan.

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Shular v. United States, USSC 18-6662, affirming an unpublished 11th Circuit Court of Appeals opinion; SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The issue in this case was whether Shular, a felon in possession of a firearm, had been convicted of 3 or more “serious drug offenses” under state law. If so, he would receive a mandatory 15-year term of imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). SCOTUS rejected Shular’s contention that a state offense qualifies as a serious drug offense if it matches a generic definition of the offenses in Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Matching is not required. The state offense only has to “involve” or “necessarily require” the conduct specified in ACCA. For more read the SCOTUSblog post.

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Jones v. Mississippi, USSC No.  18-1259, certiorari granted 3/9/20.

Question presented:

Whether the Eighth Amendment requires the sentencing authority to make a finding that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without parole.

On February 26th, SCOTUS dismissed Randall Mathena, Warden v. Lee Boyd Malvo, USSC No. 18-217, which raised the same issue. Jones is a replacement case for MalvoSee our analysis of the issue in our post on Malvo here.

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If you’re waiting for a decision on whether solicitation of 1st degree reckless injury is a crime in Wisconsin and on whether solicitation of 1st degree recklessly endangering safety is a lesser included offense of 1st degree reckless injury, STOP! SCOW just dismissed the case raising these issues–State v. Kelly James Kloss–as improvidently granted. SCOW’s really DIGing it this term. This is the second time in less than a month that it has issued a Dismissed as Improvidently Granted order. See our post on Kloss here.

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State v. Alexander M. Schultz, 2020 WI 24, affirming a published court of appeals opinion; 3/4/20; case activity (including briefs)

In a 4-3 decision, SCOW holds that the State may assert a vague charging period (i.e “late summer to early fall”) for repeated child sexual assault, but then constructively narrow the charging period after trial in order to bring a second prosecution for child sexual assault without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. [continue reading…]

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State v. T. E.-B., 2019AP309, 3/5/20, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

T. E.-B. appeals his juvenile adjudication for sexual assault of a four-year-old, arguing that the state failed to prove that the alleged assault happened when the petition said it did: “on or about June 21, 2017.” Everyone agrees that the possible range of dates for the assault doesn’t encompass that day, which was a few days after the child first reported an assault to family. Based on the child’s account, the assault actually would have to have occurred sometime between November 6, 2016 and mid-June of 2017. [continue reading…]

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Check out the new article to be published in the University of  Illinois Law Review by the prolific Michael Cicchini. It examines how Wisconsin judges accept pleas and then jump the agreed upon sentence (or joint recommendation), leaving the defendant without recourse.  The article contrasts Wisconsin practice’s with the majority of states, which don’t allow judges to sandbag defendants this way.  More significantly, though, the article offers Wisconsin defense lawyers a strategic approach (including a sample motion) for avoiding this problem in some circumstances and in some cases.  You can find the article on SSRN, or you can find it on Michael’s articles page (it’s the first article).

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