State v. Yunus E. Turkmen, 2018AP1673-CR, District 3, 8/13/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An officer stopped Turkmen after he made a U-turn in the middle of an intersection and squealed his tires loudly. (¶3). Based on that conduct and information obtained and observations made after the stop, there was a reasonable basis to extend the stop to conduct field sobriety tests. [continue reading…]
SCOWstats has been tracking how Wisconsin Supreme Court justices vote in 4th Amendment cases for years. Its last update was in 2017 when Justice Gableman was still on the court and Justices R.G. Bradley and Kelly had recently joined. Today SCOWstats posted another update through the end of the 2019 term, which included Justice Dallet. Surprise! The 4A is not DOA in SCOW, but it is on a respirator. Will Abrahamson’s replacement with Hagedorn effectively pull the plug one of our most cherished constitutional protections? Stay tuned.
County of Dunn v. Cashe L. Newville, 2018AP1167, 8/6/19, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Newville was pulled over by a sheriff’s deputy who observed that, among other things, his license plate lamps weren’t working. An arrest on suspicion of operating under the influence of methamphetamine followed. The court of appeals blesses every step in the investigation that led to that arrest. [continue reading…]
State v. Malcolm J. Sanders, 2019 WI App 52; case activity (including briefs)
Sanders is black, and the DA struck the only black jurors from serving on his case because, even though they said they could be fair, they had had prior bad experiences with police, including being the subjects of racial profiling. Judges Gundrum and Neubauer held that the DA did not discriminate. But in another “must read” dissent, Judge Reilly said:
It is a perversion of justice to accept the reasoning that because we have unfairly treated blacks (or any class of people), we can then use our wrongful acts to prevent blacks from serving on juries. Utilizing our unfair treatment of blacks as a valid “race neutral” reason to keep blacks off juries is itself discrimination. Dissent, ¶16.
Ozaukee County v. R. C.J. Y., 2019AP297, 8/7/19, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
Many Chapter 51 cases are resolved through 90-settlement agreements entered just before or just after the circuit court holds a probable cause hearing. These settlement agreements are governed by §51.20(8)(bg),(bm) and (br). [continue reading…]
State v. Darius Kavonta Smith, 2019AP642 & 643-CR, 8/6/19, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
During closing arguments, the DA made a sarcastic, belittling reference to public defenders who line up empty chairs to emphasize that the State neglected to call witnesses to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The DA also commented on witnesses whom Smith had not called. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial because the DA’s belittling of public defenders stigmatized their clients, and his comment about her failure to call witnesses improperly shifted the burden to the defense. The circuit court granted the mistrial. [continue reading…]
State v. Robert E. Hammersley, 2018AP1022, District 3, 7/30/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including appellant’s brief)
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), doesn’t provide a basis to void the revocation of Hammersley’s driver’s license back in 1995 for refusing a blood alcohol test after his OWI arrest.
[continue reading…]
State v. Medford B. Matthews, III, 2019 WI App 44; case activity (including briefs)
It’s a crime in Wisconsin to have sex with a person under 18. Specifically, it’s a misdemeanor, if that person is 16 or older—like the 17-and-a-half-year-old alleged victim here. But, it’s tough to have sex without (1) being in a private (or “secluded”) place and (2) exposing one’s genitals. And while the legislature has codified the obvious difference between having sex with, say, an 11-year-old and a 17-year-old (again, by making the latter a misdemeanor), it hasn’t drawn those lines in Wis. Stat. §§ 948.07(1) and 948.10(1), which criminalize child enticement and exposing intimate parts to a child. In each case, “child” means somebody under 18. Perhaps the legislature imagined the decency and good sense of prosecutors would prevent abuse of this discrepancy. Perhaps—no, certainly—the legislature was being optimistic. Because here, though the completed sex act the 28-year-old Matthews is charged with carries a maximum nine-month jail sentence, the six(!) associated felonies carry 65 years in prison. The circuit court called the charging decision “absurd” and “abusive” but, as the state successfully argued in the court of appeals, prosecutors have essentially total discretion: i.e., the power to act abusively, so long as they can make out the elements of an offense. And though the court of appeals telegraphs some mild discomfort with the prosecutor’s oh-so-creative exercise of this discretion, it says the the result is not absurd in a legal sense. So, it reverses the circuit court’s dismissal of the felonies. The result is that Matthews will face a potential life sentence for sex with a 17-year-old–a crime of which a truly scandalous number of us are guilty.
