Walworth County DHS v. S.S.K., 2019AP782, 7/17/19, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
During the grounds phase of the Walworth County’s TPR case against S.S.K., she “admitted” the ground of continuing CHIPS; she didn’t plead “no contest.” This distinction proved decisive to the court of appeals’ decision to affirm the termination of her parental rights to her daughter, A.S.L. [continue reading…]
State v. Kevin B. Hutchins, 2018AP1144-CR, 7/16/2019, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Hutchins had a jury trial for the alleged sexual assault, false imprisonment, and battery of the mother of his children. The judge permitted her to testify, over objection, that he had hit her on other, earlier occasions–the proffered purpose of this testimony being to show why she didn’t immediately go to the police after this incident (and thus, apparently, to defend the credibility of her story). The court of appeals affirms. [continue reading…]
Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2018AP145-FT, petition for review granted 7/10/19; case activity
Issue:
A doctor opined that David (a pseudonym) is unable to care for himself, and therefore dangerous under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am), because he lost employment and relies on the assistance of the government and his family for income and housing. As a matter of law, did the circuit err by concluding that the county, under these circumstances, met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that David is dangerous?
Today Mad in America, a nonprofit that publishes a webzine on science, psychiatry and social justice ran a long article on the dark side of “Assisted Outpatient Treatment” or, as we think of it in Wisconsin, “outpatient recommitments.” Turns out they have a very dark side. Chapter 51 practitioners may find the many studies and surveys linked to in this article helpful in preparing their clients cases. [continue reading…]
United States v. Davis, USSC No. 18-431, June 24, 2019, affirming and vacating in part, United states v. Davis, 903 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2018); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
No surprise here. Section 18 U.S.C. §924(c) makes it a crime to use a firearm during a crime of violence and 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(3)(B) defined a crime of violence as an offense that by its nature involves a substantial risk that physical force would be used in committing it. SCOTUS declared similar language unconstitutionally vague in Sessions v. Dimaya, and it followed suit here. [continue reading…]
State v. Andreal Washington, 2018AP1254-CR, 7/9/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A jury acquitted Washington of the felony murder of Williams. Then the State charged him with 2nd degree reckless homicide. Washington moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals here affirms. [continue reading…]
Marathon County v. D.K., 2017AP2217, petition for review granted 7/10/19; affirmed 2/4/2020; case activity
As our prior post noted, the court of appeals upheld D.K. (or “Donald”)’s commitment against his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. The supreme court has now agreed to decide whether the testimony of the examining physician, who was the sole witness at D.K.’s trial, supplied enough for the court to find by “clear and convincing evidence” a “substantial probability” that D.K. was dangerous. [continue reading…]
State v. John E. Paul, 2018AP1496, 7/11/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Paul had three prior OWIs and was on trial for a fourth, plus the associated PAC charge. During voir dire, the prosecutor told the jury that
the other thing is the prohibited alcohol concentration in this particular case is .02. Now, many of you may have heard of the .08, but in this instance, the prohibited alcohol concentration is .02. Now, is there any person here who thinks it’s unfair that somebody could be prosecuted or convicted of the offense of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration of .02 percent or .02 grams per 210—I forgot, but per deciliter of the defendant’s breath? So it’s a .02 standard. Is there any person here who thinks that would be unfair?
