No, not juvenile court. “Young adult” court for 18 to 24 year olds. Several states have them. Because the brains of young adults are still developing, some make dumb decisions. If they get saddled with a felony, they are unlikely to find jobs. You know where that leads. “Young adult” courts aim to stop the pernicious cycle. Read more about them on nytimes.com.
A few weeks ago, SCOW issued Universal Processing Services v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, a 4-3 decision in which an unusual alignment of justices formed the majority opinion. SCOW watchers wondered: have these 4 justices ever joined forces in a 4-3 decision before? Today’s edition of SCOWstats answers that question and examines 4-3 alignments in detail.
State v. D.W., 2016AP1827, 4/11/17, District 1,(1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
The briefs in this TPR case are confidential, so we only know what the court of appeals’ opinion tells us about the case. D.W. apparently alleged ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his trial lawyer’s failure to call witnesses and failure to move to have his son’s (A.W.’s) placement changed to a family member. He also argued that his plea was defective. The court of appeals decision is long on facts, short on law, and essentially rubber stamps the Machner court’s findings without analysis. [continue reading…]
Barron County DHHS v. C.K., 2015AP1378, 2015AP1379 & 2015AP1380, District 3, 4/11/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
C.K.’s argues she should get a new TPR trial because the circuit court erred by deciding an element of the grounds allegations without getting her personal waiver of the right to have the jury decide the element and by admitting evidence about drug activity at her home. The court of appeals rejects her claims. [continue reading…]
State v. Frank V. Blonda, 2015AP2431-CR, 4/11/17, District 1, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs).
M.L., the victim in this case, called her sister, Vincenza, and allegedly told her that Blonda had hit her in the head with a telephone. Vicenza reported this to the police. Later, M.L. told the DA’s victim advocate that she did not want to press charges, Blonda did not hit her with the phone, and she had been drinking and wasn’t sure how she had been injured. She also filed a victim impact statement, which said that her injury was due to an accident that happened in Blonda’s absence. Unfortunately, the State didn’t disclose these statements to Blonda until the first and second days of his trial. [continue reading…]
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issue:
Whether a defendant may, by voluntary absence or other conduct, waive the statutory right to be present at trial before the trial has begun?
Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (composed by On Point based on the petition for review and the state’s response to petition for review)
Is the “greater latitude” rule created by case law regarding admission of other acts evidence in child sex cases codified by § 904.04(2)(b)1., which applies to admission of other acts evidence in cases involving an array of crimes in addition to child sex offenses?
Is evidence of a defendant’s criminal acts committed against a person other than the victim admissible under § 904.04(2)(b)1. to show a generalized motive or purpose by a defendant to “control” a person with whom he is in a relationship?
State v. Brian Harris, 2017 WI 31, 4/7/17, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 2016 WI App 2; case activity (including briefs)
“This freedom from compelled self-incrimination is one of the nation’s ‘most cherished principles.’ Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458. We are sufficiently solicitous of this protection that we guard it by patrolling a generous buffer zone around the central prohibition.” Majority Op. ¶12. That’s the principle in theory. Here’s how it applies in practice.
