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McKinley Kelly v. Richard Brown, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 17-1244, 3/16/17

Two judges on the Seventh Circuit apparently think so, based on their rejection of Kelly’s motion to file a second federal habeas petition so he can challenge his sentence under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory life sentence for juvenile offenders is unconstitutional). [continue reading…]

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State v. Bruce T. Henningfield, 2015AP1824-CR, 3/15/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Bruce Henningfield was convicted by a jury of OWI and PAC counts, and was sentenced on the OWI as a tenth or subsequent offense. He raises three issues related to his prior convictions; the court rejects them all. [continue reading…]

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Review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; affirmed 4/10/18, case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point)

  1. Whether the safe transport statute, which permits transporting a handgun in a vehicle, forecloses convicting a non-permit-holder under the concealed carry law for having a handgun in his vehicle.
  2. Whether the safe transport statute’s apparent contradiction of the concealed carry statute renders the law unconstitutionally vague.

[continue reading…]

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County of Marathon v. Armin James Balzar, 2016AP1471, 3/14/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Balzar argues on appeal that the stop of his vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion because it was based on the “act of simply turning into a closed business parking lot, without more.” (¶8). The court disagrees. [continue reading…]

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State v. Roy A. Mitchell, Jr., 2016AP937-CR, 3/16/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Mitchell pled guilty to misdemeanor theft, resisting or obstructing an officer, and prostitution in exchange for the State’s agreement to dismiss charges for misdemeanor/battery, strangulation/suffocation, and felony theft. But when the State sought restitution for medical expenses incurred by the victim on the dismissed charges that involved physical contact, Mitchell objected because the victim’s injuries’ and expenses were not related to the crimes for which Mitchell was convicted and sentenced. [continue reading…]

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Jefferson County Human Serv. Dep’t v. V.B., 2016AP2468-2469, 3/16/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court found that V.B.’s children were in continuing need of protective services and thus there it had grounds to terminate her parental rights pursuant to §48.415(2).  On appeal,V.B. unsuccessfully challenged the evidence supporting the 3rd and 4th elements of continuing CHIPS–namely, that the county made reasonable efforts to provide court-ordered services to V.B. and that V.B. failed to meet the conditions for return of her children. [continue reading…]

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State v. Shaun M. Sanders, 2017 WI App 22, petition for review granted 6/13/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 51; case activity (including briefs)

When Sanders was 19 years old he was charged with committing repeated sexual assaults of H.S. during a time period when he was aged 9 to 12 and H.S. was aged 7 to 9. He asserts the circuit court had neither subject matter jurisdiction nor competency to proceed on those charges because under §§ 938.02(3m), 938.12(1), and 938.183(1)(am) persons who commit criminal acts when they are under the age of 10 are not subject to the juvenile justice code or the criminal code. The court of appeals rejects the claim. [continue reading…]

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Partial TPR summary judgment upheld

Racine County HSD v. R.E., 2016AP2039, 3/15/2017, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The record supported the circuit court’s grant of partial summary judgment on grounds of abandonment because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether R.E. had failed to visit or communicate with her child, S.E., for a period of three or more months, § 48.415(1)(a)2. [continue reading…]

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