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Where women public defenders dominate

Today’s edition of SCOWstats compares the 2015-16 term with the 1990-91 term and highlights an interesting datapoint. Women public defenders present a larger share of SCOW arguments than all other women lawyers. Their colleagues at the Department of Justice come in a close second.  But despite the dramatic rise in the number of women attending law school, private sector women lawyers present just small percentage of SCOW arguments and last term the number dipped further. What factors explain this discrepancy? Use your imagination and/or offer a comment below.

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The Juvenile Law Center just published a major report called Debtor’s Prison for Kids. It includes a searchable database showing costs, fines, fees and restitution for all 50 states, and it explains how the imposition of them leads to recidivism and racial disparity in our juvenile justice system. Read the New York Times article here or just go straight to the report.

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State v. Troy Paulson, 2015AP456-CR, 8/31/16, District 2 (1-judge opinion, not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This is the second dog sniff case from District 2 in less than a week. See our post on State v. Downer Jossi here, which recognized that SCOTUS’s Rodriguez v. United States overruled SCOW’s State v. Arias.  Paulson, however, did not fare as well as Downer Jossi.

It was midnight when Deputy Coleman stopped a car parked at a boat launch with a sign that read “no parking between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m.” He noticed a male driver and a female passenger but did not detect the odor of alcohol or marijuana or observe sexual activity. He did see a jacket stuffed around the rear passenger seat. He returned to his squad car and ordered drug dog.

In the meantime, Deputy Coleman asked lots of questions. The male driver was 26. The female was 16 (or 17). He was giving her a ride home from work. The deputy tried calling her parents and decided to wait a reasonable time for them to respond to his voicemail. He took the female’s fingerprints. That turned up nothing. Long story short, 27 minutes after the stop, the drug dog arrived and detected a controlled substance in the car. Paulson moved to suppress on the grounds that the deputy unreasonably prolonged the seizure of his car in order to conduct the dog sniff. Paulson says he should have been released as soon as the deputy completed the information check on him (as opposed to matters relating to the girl).

The court of appeals disagreed. (¶18). It held that the girl’s presence prolonged the tasks incidental to the original mission of the seizure–to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop.

¶19 Moreover, the unidentified minor was in a car with a man ten years older, after curfew, in a remote location. Her speech was slurred, she was hesitant to identify herself, nervous, and indicated her parents were unavailable. The officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to investigate the curfew violation and Paulson’s role in it, and, in any event, to ensure that the minor was safely returned to her home—including whether her parents would let her drive home with Paulson or the officer. See Gammons, 241 Wis. 2d at 306 (noting that the scope of the officer’s inquiry may be broadened beyond the original purpose of the stop if additional suspicious factors come to the officer’s attention). Consequently, whether because the initial seizure was still ongoing or was reasonably extended due to the minor’s violation of curfew, the authority for the seizure had not ended, and Paulson’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures was not violated. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.

 

 

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State v. Anthony Darnell Davis, 2016 WI App 73; case activity (including briefs)

Davis argued that he could not be convicted of recklessly causing “great bodily harm” to a child where the injuries he inflicted were bone fractures which, by statute, qualify as only “substantial bodily harm.” See Wis. Stat. § 939.22(38). The court of appeals disagreed. [continue reading…]

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State v. Paul R. Vanderlinden, 2015AP901-CR, District 3, 8/30/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vanderlinden was convicted of OWI 2nd and driving with a PAC 2nd. An officer had stopped Vanderlinden’s car because two witnesses had reported him drinking beer and leaving the theater with a beer in his pocket. According to the court of appeals, this did not amount to reasonable suspicion of OWI. [continue reading…]

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State v. Ronald Marshall Jewett, 2015AP1014-CR, District 3, 8/30/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The question presented in this case is whether a certified driving record from the Wisconsin DOT is sufficient evidence to establish 2 prior OWI convictions in Minnesota–even though the original court records for those convictions no longer exist. The court of appeals says “yes.” [continue reading…]

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State v. D.B., 2016AP440-441; 8/30/16, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

D.B. contends that his no contest plea as to the grounds for TPR was not knowing and intelligent because he did not understand the direct consequences of it–that is, that the court could order termination at the end of the disposition hearing. He thought the court would offer him treatment or parenting classes. D.B. lost on appeal based on the plea colloquy and the testimony of his attorney. [continue reading…]

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No error in joinder, denial of substitution

State v. Joe Bonds Turney, 2015AP1651-CR & 2015AP1652-CR, District 1, 8/30/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Turney claims the trial court erred in permitting joinder of two cases for trial and in denying his motion for substitution of judge following his arraignment. He also argues he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which was based on trial counsel’s failure to object to a witness’s reference to his post-arrest silence. The court of appeals rejects his claims. [continue reading…]

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