On Point

County of Milwaukee v. Alpesh Shah, 2015AP1581, District 1, 8/16/16 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Shaw was convicted of operating a motor vehicle with a restricted controlled substance in his blood pre-McNeely. He challenged the warrantless draw of his blood because there were no exigent circumstances–THC doesn’t dissipate like alcohol, and the deputy had plenty of time to get a warrant. Moreover, the State did not charge him with operating while under the influence, so dissipation wasn’t even relevant. The State only need to show that THC was present in his blood, not that a particular amount of THC was in his blood. [continue reading…]

State v. Mychael R. Hatcher, 2015AP297-CR, District 3, 8/16/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Hatcher was convicted of sexually assaulting an intoxicated person, obstructing an officer, and bail-jumping. This 38-page court of appeals decision rejects claims that the trial court erred in refusing to accept Hatcher’s guilty plea, admitting expert testimony during the State’s rebuttal, admitting evidence of the victim’s flirting, and ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for suppression and for introducing into evidence a report showing the victim’s BAC. [continue reading…]

State v. Patrick P. Haynes, 2015AP2176-CR, District 3, 8/16/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion by exceeding the OWI guidelines when sentencing Haynes for OWI 3rd after his probation for the offense was revoked. [continue reading…]

Walker Whatley v. Dushan Zatecky, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2534, 2016 WL 4269805, 8/15/16

The maximum penalty for Whatley’s drug possession conviction was dramatically increased—from 2-to-8 years to 20-to-50 years—under a now-repealed Indiana penalty enhancer for drug offenses committed within 1,000 feet of a “youth program center,” defined as a “building or structure that on a regular basis provides recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs” for youth. (Sound familiar? Sure it does: see §§ 961.01(22) and 961.49(1m)(b)5.) On habeas review, the Seventh Circuit holds that the statute’s failure to provide an objective standard for determining what “regular” means makes the statute unconstitutionally vague, so Whatley is entitled to resentencing under the non-enhanced penalty scheme. [continue reading…]

Steven D. Lisle, Jr., v. Guy Pierce, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3047, 2016 WL 4245489, 8/11/16

Lisle sought federal habeas relief from his murder and aggravated battery convictions, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated by the admission of a hearsay statement identifying him as the man who shot two people, one fatally. But the state courts reasonably applied clearly established federal law on the question, so his quest for relief is denied. [continue reading…]

Kenneth Morris v. Bryan Bartow, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3482, 2016 WL 4207960, 8/10/16

Morris claims his guilty plea to first degree reckless homicide was involuntary, and that his appellate attorney was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of involuntariness in his no-merit appeal. The Seventh Circuit rejects his claims. [continue reading…]

Brendan Dassey v. Michael A. Dittmann, U.S. District Court (E.D. Wis.) No. 14-CV-1310, 2016 WL 4257386, 8/12/16

Brendan Dassey was charged with homicide and sexual assault after confessing to being involved in the murder of Teresa Halbach along with his uncle, Steven Avery. He challenged his confession, arguing it was involuntary, but the trial court and court of appeals disagreed. In a lengthy, fact-intensive decision, a federal magistrate holds that the state courts’ conclusions involve both an unreasonable determination of the facts and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. [continue reading…]