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State v. Joshua J. Feltz, 2014AP2675-CR, District 1, 9/29/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Feltz hasn’t shown his defense was prejudiced when his trial counsel elicited a statement about the truthfulness of the victim. Nor was defense counsel deficient in agreeing to allow the prosecutor to refer in closing to the victim attending a school “where moral guidance is provided.” [continue reading…]

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Percell Dansberry v. Randy Pfister, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 13-3723, 9/15/15

The judge who took Dansberry’s guilty plea understated the mandatory minimum sentence Dansberry faced, and therefore Dansberry’s plea was not entered with a full understanding of the consequences, as required under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). But the Supreme Court has not held Boykin errors to be structural, so the state court’s rejection of his plea withdrawal motion on harmless error grounds was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. [continue reading…]

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Michael Belleau v. Edward Wall, Case No. 12-CV-1198 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2015); reversed (1/29/16).

“The question presented in this case is whether … a person who has already served his sentence for his crimes and is no longer under any form of court ordered supervision can be forced by the State to wear such a device and to pay the State for the cost of monitoring him for the rest of his life.” (Slip op. at 11). A federal district judge answers “no” to that question, and holds that requiring Belleau to comply with § 301.48 by wearing a GPS tracking device for the rest of his life after he had finished his criminal sentence and was discharged from his ch. 980 commitment violates the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws and the Fourth Amendment. [continue reading…]

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The Supreme Court’s Secret Power

Today, the New York Times ran an interesting oped by Prof. Jeff Fisher of Stanford Law School’s Supreme Court clinic. He argues that the SCOTUS should indicate how each justice voted when deciding to grant or deny a petition for writ of certiorari. “[T]he justices should let the country know how they are each using the enormous agenda-setting authority we have entrusted to them.” Click here for the full article.

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Evidence sufficient to support Ch. 51 commitment

Kenosha County v. CMM, 2015AP504, 9/23/15, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

Like many Chapter 51 appeals, this one didn’t challenge any legal standards. It argued that the evidence in this particular case did not meet the test for “dangerousness” in §51.20(1)(a)2.d. The court of appeals found the evidence more than sufficient. [continue reading…]

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Ozaukee County v. M.L.G., 2015AP1469-FT, 9/23/15, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

More specifically, the court of appeals held that the County had offered evidence sufficient to establish that MLG was dangerous under §51.20(1)(a)2.c and that he was substantially incapable of understanding his treatment options under § 51.61(1)(g)4b: [continue reading…]

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State v. Christopher J. Oatman, 2015 WI App 76; case activity (including briefs)

The statute prohibiting a registered sex offender from intentionally photographing a minor without parental consent, § 948.14, violates the First Amendment because it “indiscriminately casts a wide net over expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment ….” (¶18, quoting State v. Stevenson, 2000 WI 71, ¶22, 236 Wis. 2d 86, 613 N.W.2d 90). [continue reading…]

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Little Chute Village Municipal Court v. Dennis M. Falkosky, 2015AP770, District 3, 9/22/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The trial court didn’t err by refusing to modify the standard OWI jury instruction, Wis. J.I.—Criminal 2668, by taking out language giving blood alcohol test results prima facie effect as to the defendant’s BAC at the time of driving and replacing the language with the instruction addressing the blood alcohol curve, Wis. J.I.—Criminal 234. [continue reading…]

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